1844.] 



THE CIVIL ENGINEER AND ARCHITECTS JOURNAL. 



229 



of a war ag.iinst Great Britain, and it is evident to every one tliat in 

 such case we should liave few friends on t)ie seas;'" our maritime 

 commerce would not fail to disappear. How far from France then 

 obtain fuel ? Our steamers, deprived of that principle of all their 

 action, would be reduced to muke use only of their sails, and it is 

 known that for the present they are poor sailers; liiey would make 

 but a sorry figure against corvettes or brigs of the slightest mould. 



Perhaps the use of the screw, by leaving the steamer all the power 

 of a sailing vessel, will some day produce a change in this state of 

 things. Steam will then become a powerful auxiliary to our cruisers, 

 but this alliance of sail and steam would change nothing as to what I 

 have before laid down. The steamer, destined to serve in squadron 

 or on our coasts, should always have a high speed, by steam alone, as 

 the first means of success.'"' 



I have finished what I wished to point out in this note, and I have 

 nothing to do but sum up in a few words. 



Taking the chances, however distant they may be," of a war with 

 England, as the basis of our naval establishment, I have said thiit 1 

 thought it might be thus defined : — ■ 



PoKtrful organization and developement of our ateam navy on our 

 coasls and in the Mtdikrranean. 



EHlablishments of powerful and well-managed cruisers on every point 

 of tilt: globe, where in peace our commerce has interests, or in war we can 

 act fcith advantage. 



To realise the first part of what I require, we must as quickly as 

 possible stop the unfortunate current which drags the navy into useless 

 expenses of material and establishraonts disproportioned to its wants, 

 to the expenses of the fleet, real and living expression of our naval 

 force. 



This will give us the means of meeting the expenses really neces- 

 sary. 



We must then withdraw our confidence in ships of the line, and 

 apply ourselves to designing and perfecting our steamers; particularly 

 in trying them, before making a number of the same model, which in 

 case of ill success causes inconveniences of which we have many 

 instances. 



Give each service its port. 



Keep up a fleet of at least twenty steamers ready for war. Give 

 up to this fleet the studv of the tactics to be prepared for a steam 

 fleet. 



Assign to the service of the Algerine packet boats a sufficient part, 

 but rigorously limited as is done for the Levant packet service. The 

 wants of war are not so imperious in Africa as to require all the re- 

 sources of the navy to be sacrificed to them, and every idea of order 

 and economy. The navy might very advantageously get rid of its 

 160 h. p. steamers by giving them as the cost of establishment of this 

 first service. 



Create a certain number of light steamers, in which everything 

 would be sacrificed to speed, to carry the orders of the government. 



Id fine keep at least two and twenty first rate frigates armed for the 

 service of distant stations. 



Leaving out the expense of creating the vessels, the expense of 

 maintenance will not exceed those of our actual fleet. With a navy 

 thus organized, we shall be able to resist any attempt to wound our 

 honour or our interests and a declaration of war would never risk our 

 being found without defence. In fine, we should have the means of 

 acting immediately, without exposing all our resources to a single 

 hazard. 



And dwell upon this latter point all these results we should obtain 

 without a serious increase of expense. (See Appendix C.) 



What if, to belie my assertions, they were called Utopian, a term 

 marvellously adapted to frighten timid minds, and to force them into 

 the rut of routine, I would ask those who answered me in this way to 

 consider attentively all that has been done in the last few years and 

 what is still being done in England, and then to say in good faith, 

 whether it cannot as well be realized in France. 



It has given me pain, in the whole course of this short writing, to 

 subject my country to an afflicting parallel with a country which so 

 far exceeds it in the knowledge of its interests; it has given me pain 

 to lay bare the secret of our weakness in sight of the spectacle of 

 English power. But I should consider myself fortunate if I could by 



39 We should think not. 



4 The screw propeller is calculnted for reasons before mentioned, to give much greater 

 power to expand. 



41 Why should it be assumed that there is even the chance of a war between England 

 and France. There certainly is no reason for it. We have no wish to make an aggression 

 on France, and if France is ever destined to enjoy the advantages of English privilegei, It 

 must be by the moral operatioo of events. 



the sincere acknowledgement of these lamentable truths, dissipate the 

 illusion in which to many intelligent minds are as to the real state of 

 the naval forces of France, and determine them to demand with me a 

 salutary reform which may give our navy a new era of power and 

 glory. ■ 



APPENDIX A. 



The Navy List of the 1st January 1844, bears 



43 slenmers aHoat. 



18 IjuiMing. 



18 transatlantic tteam-packets, of which* several are finished and the others 

 far advanced. 



Finally, the Post Office reckons for correspondence with the Levant, Alex- 

 andrin, Corsica and England, 



24 steam -packets from 50 h. p. lo 220 li. p. 



Total 103. 



In all 103 steam vessels, a considerable number, but one which it is neces- 

 s iry to reduce to its real value. 



We must first of all remove from the list the 24 post office steam packets 

 constructed and fitted for a peace service. Time would he required to adapt 

 these vessels for war. This transformation, it should be well known, cannot 

 be done at once, especially with the necessity of operating simultaneously on 

 42 steamers, mostly of large dimension. We should deceive ourselves then if 

 we imagined that these steam packets, because they are solidly built and 

 pierced for ports, would have nothing to do on the breaking out of war, than 

 to take on board their guns and ammunition. Do we know besides, since no 

 experiment has been made, whether the weight of the war equipment will not 

 deprive them of the only advantage acknowledged in them till now, that of 

 speed ? We should have to make a clear deck from stem to stern. All those 

 costly fittings, all those objects of luxury and comfort must make way for the 

 severe nudity of a man of war's deck. A warcrew is not to be lodged like 

 passengers who purchase the right of comfort ; there must he large bulk for 

 water, provisions, powder and shot. 



Every thing would have to be created for a destination so new, and so dif- 

 ferent. 



It must be repeated such a transformation cannot be made at once ; it can 

 only be slow and successive. 



We can only then consider these 42 steamers as a reserve, and introduce 

 them as such in the calculation of our naval power. It appears to us that 

 it would be very wrong to reckon on the integrality of this amount, since on 

 the commencement of war, a portion of these steam packets, employed in 

 pursuing their pacific mission, would inevitably fall into the hands of the 

 enemy's cruisers, or even remain blockaded in neutral ports by the mere 

 fact of a declaration of war. 



It only remains then, after this examination to occupy ourselves with the 

 purely military poriion of the steam fleet, if that which in time of war would 

 present immediate and elfective resources. This still exhibits a total of 61 

 steamers ; but here we find we have a new deduction to make, for ships 

 building cannot be reckoned among present resources ; like the steam packets 

 we must consider them as a reserve, and still on condition that they be ad- 

 vanced, to the 22—24 [nearly complelel ; that then is what cannot be done 

 with the greater number. Many of these vessels are not commenced ; the 

 Coligny, for instance. 



In tine we reduce to 43 vessels our steam force now disposable, now effec- 

 tive, that wdiieh on a sudden eventuality, would lie called on to give and 

 ward off the first blows. 



It is this total of 43 that we propose to examine. 



^\■e first of all sec in this list 3 vessels of 4J0 h. p.*, the Gomer, the Asmode'e, 

 and the Inftrnal, rated as frigates. Tlie two first have given satisfactory re- 

 sults with regard to speed, but have not been able to take the equipment in- 

 tended for them. The Guuar «'ith its supply of fuel and its 22 guns, was 

 unable to keep the sea; and it was requisite to reduce either the stock of fuel 

 or the guns. The latter alternative was determined on. The Gomer has 

 worked easily enough, but it is no longer a ship of war, but a packet ; its 

 whole artillery is 8 guns, of which 2; eighty pounders, and 6 thirly pound 

 howitzers, enclosed in narrow ports on the sides of the vessel, an impotent 

 and useless armament ; and still in this condition, the vessel labours a good 

 deal in bad weather. 



As to the Asmodee it seems to have succeeded better than the Gomer ; but 

 both want power, and in rough weather, their machinery is paralyzed. How- 

 ever this may be, it is willingly acknowledged that by applying to them a 

 suitable mode of armament, they might be converted into vessels truly adapted 

 for war service. 



Before going further it will perhaps be right to explain what is meant in 



« See Table, No. 1. 



