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THE CIVIL ENGINEER AND ARCHITECTS JOURNAL. 



^S 



E P T E M B E R , 



purposes, or strive with tbe noble and the proud aim of ameliorating 

 my country's art. 



First, «liat is criticism ? — Criticism is a brancli of polite science, 

 and wlien found in union with art becomes an index to its position. 

 From this arises its importance. It is also a court, where the several 

 disputes of art are brought to issue, and upon the decisions of which 

 the public opinion stands : hence arises its influence. The foundation 

 of its laws, is based on sense, imagination, and judgment, as the three 

 natural powers it attempts to move. Its laws of adjudication vary 

 according to the claims of art, and according to the nature of appeal; 

 and from the labour necessary to frame these laws, and to apply them, 

 is inferred the necessity of their adoption. An appeal to ihe judg- 

 ment of criticism, is based upon plausibility, and implies public assent 

 to certain principles; these however, critics as counsel in the social 

 contentions of art, quarrel upon, whilst the judge "nature" sits to dis- 

 entangle and apply them. The arguments vary first, according to the 

 art, and secondly, accordingly to the nature of its claim, — its claims 

 being always in the shape of some emotion, (emotion being the aim of 

 the affecting arts) the fitness, or unfitness of which, for the present is 

 immaterial. The institution of the court itself, is founded upon pre- 

 sumed error, as implying an uncertain acquaintance with those laws, 

 which are the philosophy of our taste. It follows then, in order to 

 meet the wisdom of such an institution, that the principles which de- 

 tect the propriety, or expose the error of appeal, should be free from 

 arbitrary application. It is first then, upon the necessity of a judgment 

 in matters of art, secondly, — upon the required clearness of the laws 

 of judgment, and, thirdly, upon the arbitrary interpretation of those 

 laws, which interpretation, I for the present assume to exist, that I am 

 induced to throw out a few hints on criticism, which I hope will be 

 received by the reader with a politeness due to the subject, however 

 in exhibiting this politeness, he may disguise a dislike to what may 

 appear officious interference in the writer. However these hints may 

 be generally received, the man of correct taste knows that it is not an 

 irrational task, to dissect those principles which aid us, or ought to 

 aid us, as we either feel or affect a love for the great examples of art. 

 He knows that about architectural excellence there is an air of mys- 

 tery : so that without any implied reproach upon the elegance of any 

 choice hitherto made, or which may be made, he would prefer our 

 being guided by principle, rather than by instinct, in our search after 

 the beautiful, and that instead of wrangling over fragments, like beasts 

 over carcases, he would choose an explanation of the real basis of 

 choice, of which a noble profession cannot be ashamed. The very 

 circumstance of our choice being a habit, requires that some eftbrt be 

 made to enlarge and unfetter the mind, so that by infusing into it those 

 ideas which are the very key to effective design, we may stand in 

 rivalry with the ancients; — adopting if we please their beauties, but 

 adopting them from choice, not from necessity. 



I feel strongly on the subject, because it is so important that archi- 

 tecture should rank amidst the poetic arts, and that the attainment to 

 architectural excellence, shall be only by the acknowledged effort of 

 genius. 1 feel strorgly too, because I conceive it is owing to our nega- 

 tive character as artists, and our supine imitation, that critics rise no 

 higher in their views. The architect of original bent, feels the in- 

 competency of ordinary men to discuss his claims : a critic in his idea, 

 being a man who has only read through Creasy or Stewart, or if learned 

 in Christian architecture, has his dictionary of reference only in some 

 convenient examples. He is unfamiliar with the man of that severe 

 yet elegant mind whose opinion he covets. He has been deceived in 

 fancying architecture an art, where conception, the inseparable com- 

 panion of genius, might alight. The root of the defect at once ap- 

 pears in criticism, which is confined to certain laws inimical to inven- 

 tion. The evil of this criticism is, that it limits that range of mind 

 which every other poetic art allows, and is either founded on a pre- 

 sumption against the poetry of the art, or against the ability of its 

 students. If in the former ground it is inconsistent, because that com- 

 bination of parts, with the ancients so fortuitous, being deemed by 

 many the monopolist of beauty, shows an argument then against the 

 poetry of the art, for poetry is confined to no set disposition of forms. 

 If on the latter ground it is a libel upon the genius of our nation, and 

 stagnates by its mean policy, those eflbrts which might introduce fresh 

 beauties amongst us. I admit that our rules are protective, and ex- 

 clude many incongruities; but would it not be more honourable to 

 make the antique amenable only to fresh creations ? very possible if as 

 artists we catch the spirit of oui masters. It being evident then, that 

 our art for inventive beauty is far behind the other arts, with which it 

 claims sisterhood, and that however good this claim to equality may 

 be, it does not appear either from the pen of the critic, or the example 

 of the architect, to be so dignified; it follows, as a natural consequence, 

 that to maintain this kindred claim, there should be shown a similarity 

 of laws, by which the composition is governed, and by which the emo- 



tions are engaged : it follows too, if this be the case, that then, our 

 laws of criticism are erroneous, or capricious, being essentially at 

 variance with those of other arts. 



In watching the progress of a design, in either art, to its completion, 

 that is in observing that anatomy of thought out of which the com- 

 position is formed, we may perceive a relationship existing, although 

 we do not yet admit its existence. We read an able critique upon 

 poetry, music, sculpture or painting, and the mind responding with 

 ready fidelity to truth, becomes at once conscious that it hears in that 

 criticism, but the echo of its own suggestions : but architectural criti- 

 cism we do not feel in this way, and purely because its compositions 

 are not criticized on the same ground, the mechanical being ever 

 judged as in partial skirmish with the poetical. Architecture how- 

 ever, is not more mechanical than the other arts, for the conception 

 which occupies the brain of the poet, or the painter, can onlv acquire 

 a correct and tangible shape by a process of adjustment. Calculation 

 enters into the design; associations are dwelt upon ; and the senti- 

 ment which is to appear is only featured by a careful arrangement. 

 Music, amidst all its sweetness and harmony, has its mechanism. The 

 rush of chords, the softer modulation, independent of tbe art, which, 

 if I may so speak, can embody for the ear its anticijjations, is but the 

 sale of a passion, or a sentiment, shaped and tutored in the mind, with 

 reference to situation, circumstance, time and probability. Each art 

 is alike too in its finished performances : they are so many appeals to 

 the mind through the senses; music, through the ear, sculpture, paint- 

 ing, and architecture through the eye, poetry through the eye and ear, 

 and it is upon this beautiful and exquisite web of sensation, that the 

 power of art moves. But supposing that architecture be equally with 

 the other arts, a mirror where the eye can seek objects, which the 

 mind may enjoy, a barrier intrudes itself at once, in the shape of that 

 word, "taste," (which like the ghost of Junius assumes a variety of 

 shapes) to make it doubtful after all, whether there can be shown 

 common grounds, upon which the feelings are moved. It will be ne- 

 cessary then, to define this word " taste," because if this be unex- 

 plained, we may be only right by chance. 



It has been deemed a fruitless task, to reconcile to a principle the 

 varying opinions current upon the same object in arts, each of which 

 is termed the opinion of taste, because of the different degrees of 

 sensibility and imagination found in different minds, and because it 

 has been observed, that the same object, which is viewed carelessly 

 by one man, fills another man with exquisite delight. Strange as these 

 differences may appear, they are all to be traced to one source. The 

 taste of a man which is a progressing principle, receives its perfect 

 development only from time. Taste which in infancy is mere sense, 

 becomes improved as imagination and reason blend to assist it. — 

 Taste resulting not from a simple idea, but from the union of reason 

 and imagination, varies then not according to that chance inseparable 

 from a simple notion, but according to tlie effort of the imagination 

 and the exercise of the judgment, the latter quality of the mind being 

 a determinable thing, whose degree of ability is proportioned to the 

 attention and care bestowed. Imagination too, though a power ex- 

 tremely elastic, resembles when engaged with architecture, either 

 more or less that faculty we denominate "taste," for its essential 

 power then lies in tracing resemblances, and it is either perfect or ad- 

 vancing towards perfection, according to the degree cf judgment in 

 simultaneous exercise. Thus taste is subject to degree, and according 

 to this degree of taste in different individuals, we find the degree of 

 refined pleasure which a work of art produces. Taste which is a 

 habit is therefore imperfect taste, because inimical to progression. 

 Hence habit which is the origin of our views in a great measure, may 

 explain the source of our arcTiitectural taste. 



Independently of this definition of taste, and the grounds of its sup- 

 port, there is a further difficulty attendant upon its application to 

 architecture, from the circumstance of there being little or no direct 

 appeal to the sympathies, which the painter, the poet, and the sculptor, 

 so powerfully affect, and which the rudest mind intuitively feels, with- 

 out previous study, to acquaint him with the source of his emotion. 

 This is one reason why public opinion varies so much ; men untaught, 

 with their judgments unassisted, feeling that emotion is the object of 

 the art, are precipitated into hasty conclusions, just because their 

 sympathies cannot be awakened. A correct taste in architecture is 

 more difficult than in any other art, because the ideal resemblances 

 aflecting the mind are more remote : and this is the reason why the 

 taste is pleased by figures, pictures, statues or striking ornaments, to 

 the prejudice very often of a taste strictly architectural : — the mind 

 being conducted towards familiar objects. 



The essential difference between architecture and the other poetic 

 arts, consists then in this suggestive character, whilst the poetry it ex- 

 hibits, appears in expression, attitude, or relative position. It has 

 however, all the attributes of the other arts at command, and which it 



