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THE CIVIL ENGINEER AND ARCHITECT'S JOURNAL. 



371 



The strictly suggestive character is, where flie object has no counter- 

 part in nature, but where, from a certain altitude or proportion in the 

 tigure, assisted by relative position, the mind is left to suggest to itself 

 an object in nature, expressive of some ideal quality, to which the 

 figure might claim a point or two of resemblance. 



In the comparison between the figure which has no counterpart in 

 nature, and that which the imagination furnishes, there is extreme 

 delicacy of perception requisite to detect a similitude ; for, in exer- 

 cising this power of comparison, we but transpose the elements of 

 wit, since the strength of wit whicli consists in its delicacy is but the 

 perception of a certain resemblance between two things, not essen- 

 tially similar, but alike only in those features of which the idea takes 

 cognizance. Two ideas in this case present themselves, and the rela- 

 tion found in those ideas, after the test of comparison, is essentially 

 the product of wit. The relish which the mind has for this ingenious 

 activity, the natural bias there is ap|)arent in most of u-;, to indulge in 

 this harmless intricacy of thought, — the pleasure too which we ex- 

 perience in detecting the force of an allusion, all imply an innate 

 power in the mind to perceive a possible harmony or relationship be- 

 tween two separate and distinct things. It is in fact a self creative 

 power, which for the time the mind exercises, by which out of ap- 

 parently inapt materials, it shapes a perfect idea. Applying this to 

 architecture, we may at once perceive the origin of the claim, which 

 its inanimate features have upon us. Furtiier to examine into the 

 principle which moves us, we may perceive, that in the comparison 

 of wit, however varied the play of fancy, or however apportioned the 

 strength of perception may be, the ideas placed in juxtaposition, are 

 not seen directly in the attribute of an object, but in that which is 

 mostly associated with that attribute, — viz. the attitude or position by 

 which we judge of the mind or intention. It is the external sign 

 which wit first embraces, and not the inward evidence, and hence it 

 is we comprehend 'he force of the ludicrous, (which is in truth the 

 force of unexpressed wit) from figure, attitude, Sic, our idea of plea- 

 sure arising from conflicting associations, — that is, from certain real 

 or declared properties of the object, or of the mind through the object 

 being seen connected with associations, which we perceive totally at 

 variance with those naturally connected with them. It is upon this 

 ground that we smile at the large head of a dwarf, or at the affectation 

 of delicacy in a fat person, or laugh at the threatening attitude of a 

 little slender man: therefore the pleasure of comparison is the plea- 

 sure of attitude ; and inasmuch as this pleasure may be carried from 

 wit to poetry, a definition of the poetry of attitude is necessary to 

 assist in supporting the poetry of architecture. 



The attitude of an object affects us then because we observe certain 

 dispositions of the mind when exhibited, are frequently associated 

 with certain attitudes, which, when unstudied appear natural, until 

 from frequent observation that the same attitude is an index to the 

 same disposition of the mind, we identify that altitude with it. It is 

 this which has given personification to still life, and peopled nature 

 with living beauty and grandeur. It is this same principle which has 

 associated the willow with grief, and the oak with stubborn dignity ; — 

 which has detected modesty in a flower, or discovered wanton beauty 

 in moving foliage. It is in truth the principle of life to the art of the 

 poet, and it is by this that the poet is understood. The spectator of 

 nature admits this in his own emotions, as he watches those objects 

 which surround him, for he sees the graphic power of scenic poetry 

 to consist in its picture of attitudes. The poet admits its influence 

 still more delicately when he allows an attitude to invisible things. It 

 was a conscionsness of the poetry of attitude, that induced the lines : 



"I'is swoot io listen :is the night v imls 

 From Wv.i to loaf.'' 



reop 



For whilst tlie ear is made sensible of the approach of the winds, the 

 eye also may observe their furtive melancholy progress. It is thus 

 then that attitude engages us, but attitude is not always significant of 

 a collected state of mind ; — there is often a carelessness about it which 

 induces a different emotion from that attitude, which directly expresses 

 an idea : it being always borne in min<l that the cbject is for a time 

 the persoiiification of feeling and of will. A similar kind of ell'ect is 

 produced on the mind in such a case, only very laintly, — there being 

 no definable idea connected therewith. It is very frequently the case 

 in architecture that we feel the truth of this, as we revel amidst the 

 .smaller attractions of a comirosition, where we perceive abuut its 

 minutiae, attitudes, which we think beautiful, without knowing why. 

 This innocent perplexity of thought which assails the mind, leaving it 

 only when it has bewildered it, is the very secret of all the interest 

 created: the reason being tempted into inmmiei'able petty defeats, 

 from each of which it arises to encounter a fresh one, as the several 

 parts of beauty appear to seduce it on. It is here that cri'.icism is 

 disarmed, — criticism taking cognizance ouly of the position and ex- 



tent of such attraction; and, it is because criticism is disarmed at this 

 point, that architecture often exhibits such redundancy of beauty, 

 which sickens the fancy and the taste. Attitude however has its 

 carelessness, in a nearer approach than this to individual beauty, that 

 is, where there is a more definite proportion traceable through its 

 parts, though the same perplexity of the mind may be preserved ; and 

 it is in this state of attitude that we discover the beautiful in archi- 

 tecture, and by this are enabled to depict its ideal of grace or of 

 grandeur. Byron beautifully illustrates this thought in his description 

 of Dudu : 



Few angles were tlcre m her form, 'tis true, 

 Thinner she iniglit have been an<l yet scarce lose ; 

 Yet, alter all. 'twould puziile to say where 

 It would not spoil some separate charm to pare. 



She looked • ■ 



'Iho mortal and the ni.irble still at strife, 

 And timidly e.spaniliiig into life. 



Admiration of women in general, springs from the same subtle and 

 exquisite cause : our ideas moving like the movements of sense amidst 

 the same perplexities, becoming as we gaze, like the lovely cause, an 

 elegant deceit For to admire woman requires not that we be absorbed 

 by her mind, or her acquirements, since to appreciate either, we must 

 turn to the cold test of a balance, or a criticism : nor do we descend 

 to t' e base notion that she is the mere adjunct of pleasure, since 

 poetry, the very element of her charms must then decay. No! — we 

 seek her as a riddle, — we love her as an enigma, — we chase her through 

 the follies of her course as a lovely inconsistency, — as a fanciful ligut 

 we would snatch at and grasp. Our vanity tempts us to seize this for 

 ourselves, which nothing seems to arrest, and to hug this creature of 

 caresses, if only to rob nature of her dearest child. 



Our ideas of grace and grandeur in architecture becoming then often 

 those of attitude, as do those of the beautiful and sublime in nature, — 

 grace, which we identify with no particular proportion when dis- 

 covered in nature, becomes at once in attitude a lovely perplexity, — a 

 creature of careless, yet correct shape, which, at a motion however 

 slight, would take another form of elegance, as beautiful as she herself 

 would be unconscious. Grandeur differs from grace, inasmuch as the 

 energetic differs from the wanton, so that grandeur is always the crea- 

 ture of comparison, whose colossal form suggesting powers, contrasts 

 itself with familiar trifles. 



The principle which affects us has already been shown, but looking 

 at this in a simpler and more homely guise, we may say that it is the 

 poetry of attitude, wdiich is the poetry of arrangement; — that is dis- 

 plays itself iu domestic taste, and gives to the taste of a woman, that 

 elegance and beauty so peculiarly her own. It is because her mind 

 can engage itself in such gentle and beautiful comparisons, — because 

 her perception of things is but a perception of their poetry, — because 

 ("which is a consequence) she allows nothing, and admits nothing around 

 her, but such as can echo to her sensitively graceful mind, that her 

 abode is replete with harmony, and beauty, and love. 



Such is a feeble definition of the poetry of attitude, which is uni- 

 versal throughout nature, whether exhibited in her minuteness or her 

 vastness, and such is a scanty description of that subtle faculty which 

 extracts from her ever varying flowers, that honey which it hives for 

 the nourishment of art. 



Laboured as such reasoning may appear, inapplicable as such ab- 

 stract considerations may be thought to the practical requirements of 

 art, there is nevertheless in such an analysis, the exposure of poetry 

 in its germ. There is, in testing our sensations by the varieties of 

 nature, that secret spring opened into activity, which enriches the 

 productions of art, and causes beauty, grace and grandeur, to stai-t from 

 the inanimate stone. There is, in generalizing our views, a liberality 

 given to the mind, which deducing out of its observations, the true 

 principles which affect it, begets an intuitive confidence in its own 

 powers, to conceive and embody for the eye, its ever beauteous — ever 

 endless creations. The deduction from the argument is, that if nature 

 be the poet's laboratory, ami if attitude prove to the mind one of her 

 most operative principles, then, the degree of poetry in architecture 

 bears a ratio (as far as attitude is concerned) to her power over atti- 

 tude. It has already been shown by inference that she has this display 

 of attitude, and that she embraces the same materials of beauty, which 

 we see in external n;iture, therefore, as children of nature, we assert 

 the poetry of our art. We know too that she has the same scenic 

 effects from the lights and shadows she distributes; for when, as in 

 the cathedra), these f.iU softly on surrounding objects, or when the eye 

 sinks wearied from its awful wanderings amidst vastness and obscurity, 

 to repose amidst beauties which peep from the dimest perspective, 

 chords of joy swept by attitude vibrate on to entrance the senses. 



So much for the principle which moves us, and so much for the 

 argument in favour of architecture and her claims to criticism: yet, it 



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