limits of philosophical inquiry ; and I cannot bring out 

 my own views better than by contrasting them with 

 those so plainly, and, in the main, fairly stated by the 

 Archbishop of York. But I may be permitted to make 

 a preliminary comment upon an occurrence that greatly 

 astonished me. Applying the name of " the New Phil- 

 osophy" to that estimate of the limits of philosophical 

 inquiry which I, in common with many other men of sci- 

 ence, hold to be just, the Archbishop opens his address 

 by identifying this " new philosophy" with the positive 

 philosophy of M. Comte (of whom he speaks as its "found- 

 er") ; and then proceeds to attack that philosopher and 

 his doctrine vigorously. Now, so far as I am concerned, 

 the most Reverend prelate might dialectically hew M. 

 Comte in pieces, as a modern Agag, and I should not 

 attempt to stay his hand. In so far as my study of what 

 specially characterizes the Positive Philosophy has led 

 me, I find therein little or nothing of any scientific value, 

 and a great deal which is as thoroughly antagonistic to 

 the very essence of science as anything in ultramon- 

 tane Catholicism. In fact, M. Comte's philosophy in 

 practice might be compendiously described as Catholi- 

 cism minus Christianity. But what has Comptism to do 

 with the " New Philosophy," as the Archbishop defines 

 it in the following passage ? 



" Let me briefly remind you of the leading principles 

 of this new philosophy. 



" All knowledge is experience of facts acquired by the 

 senses. The traditions of older philosophies have ob- 

 scured our experience by mixing with it much that the 

 senses cannot observe, and until these additions are dis- 



