34 



pable of being answered, and therefore not worth the 

 attention of men who have work to do in the world. 

 And thus ends one of his essays : 



" If we take in hand any volume of Divinity, or school 

 metaphysics, for instance, let us ask, Does it contain any 

 abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number ? No. 

 Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning mat- 

 ter of fact and existence ? No. Commit it then to the 

 flames ; for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illu- 



sion." 



Permit me to enforce this most wise advice. Why 

 trouble ourselves about matters of which, however im- 

 portant they may be, we do know nothing, and can know 

 nothing ? We live in a world which is full of misery and 

 ignorance, and the plain duty of each and all of us is to 

 try to make the little corner he can influence somewhat 

 less miserable and somewhat less ignorant than it was 

 before he entered it. To do this effectually it is necessary 

 to be fully possessed of only two beliefs : the first, that 

 the order of nature is ascertainable by our faculties to 

 an extent which is practically unlimited ; the second, 

 that our volition counts for something as a condition of 

 the course of events. Each of these beliefs can be ver- 

 ified experimentally, as often as we like to try. Each, 

 therefore, stands upon the strongest foundation upon 

 which any belief can rest ; and forms one of our highest 

 truths. 



If we find that the ascertainment of the order of nature 

 is facilitated by using one terminology, or one set of sym- 

 bols, rather than another, it is our clear duty to use the 

 former, and no harm can accrue so long as we bear in 

 mind that we are dealing merely with terms and symbols. 



