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phenomena of thought as thought. Yet Mr. Huxley 

 tells us that thought is but the expression of the mo- 

 lecular changes of protoplasm. This he only tells us ; 

 this he does not prove. He merely says that, if we ad- 

 mit the functions of the lowest forms of life to be but 

 " direct results of the nature of the matter of which 

 they are composed," we must admit as much for the 

 functions of the highest. We have not admitted Mr. 

 Huxley's presupposition \ but, even with its admission, 

 we should not feel bound to admit his conclusion. In 

 such a mighty system of differences, there are ample 

 room and verge enough for the introduction of new mo- 

 tives. We can say here at once, in fact, that as thought, 

 let its connection be what it may with, has never been 

 proved to result from, organization, no improvement of 

 the proof required will be found in protoplasm. No one 

 power that Mr. Huxley signalizes in protoplasm can ac- 

 count for thought : not alimentation, and not reproduc- 

 tion, certainly ; but not even contractility. We have 

 seen already that there is no proof of contraction being 

 necessary even for the simplest sensation ; but much 

 less is there any proof of a necessity of contraction for 

 the inner and independent operations of the mind. Mr. 

 Huxley himself admits this. He says : " Speech, ges- 

 ture, and every other form of human action are, in the 

 long-run, resolvable into muscular contraction ;" and so, 

 " even those manifestations of intellect, of feeling, and 

 of will, which we rightly name the higher faculties, are 

 not excluded from this classification, inasmuch as to 

 every one but the subject of them, they are known only as 

 transitory changes in the relative positions of pa~ts of 

 the body." The concession is made here, we see, that 

 these manifestations are differently known to the sub 



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