ON SOUNDNESS. 15 



betoken its approacli, waiting only for work or other ex- 

 citing cause for its development ; and with such betoken- 

 ment before us it is quite impossible we can, with any show 

 of reason or equity, pronounce the horse having them, not- 

 withstanding he at the time goes free from lameness, to bo 

 virtually a sound horse ; for how can we in conscience call 

 that horse sound that we know has that about him which 

 will probably — nay, certainly, cause him to become lame 

 the first long or heavy day's work he is put to perform ? 

 As well might we call an apple or a pear sound which we 

 know to be rotten at the core ; and yet, strictly and liter- 

 ally speaking, the animal goes sound — is as sound in action, 

 to appearance, as is the rotten apple or pear. In cases 

 where so much difficulty — nay, impossibility, presents it- 

 self to the drawing of a distinction between the two op- 

 posite, and (as we may call them) abhorrent states of 

 soundness and unsoundness, it has struck us some good 

 might arise from a division of unsoundness into actual and 

 prospective, the latter denomination indicating a state of 

 transient or trustless soundness. 



Notwithstanding a horse may be free from lameness, 

 may go sound, yet, so long as he has that about him which 

 will probably or surely render him lame the first time he 

 is put to hard work, he is virtually an unsound horse, in 

 honesty unwarrantable ; and the best denomination we are 

 able to find for such a failable condition — a sort of inter- 

 mediate state between soundness and unsoundness — is 

 prospective unsoundness. So far as abstract action is con- 

 cerned, the horse, it is true, must be regarded as sounds 

 although that which he has upon him, making him liable 

 or certain to become lame whenever he is put to excess of 

 , action or work, certainly stands in the way of any warranty 

 of soundness being given. 



