April, 1913. 



KNOWLEDGE. 



155 



body without a soul, a life without an objective. But at the 

 same time we must also plainly see that this failure is not due 

 to science in itself, but to the extravagant claims that were 

 made in its behalf. It was thrust into the giant's robe, and 

 could not help but trip over it. It is rather remarkable to 

 think that the necessarily restricted range of physical science 

 was lost sight of by its most gifted exponents. The rule of 

 the game (so to speak) which arbitrarily assigned matter and 

 energy alone to scientific activity, neglecting any other forces 

 or entities that might exist beyond these — this rule was 

 forgotten by the very players who imposed it. After thus 

 consciously and willingly setting limits for themselves, they 

 went on to declare — some openly, some tacitly — that these 

 limits included the whole contents of humanity's intellectual 

 aspirations ! All that science could teach was all there was 

 to know ! 



The enormous success that resulted in this limited field is 

 the only extenuation — and a very poor one it is — for such 

 conduct. The scientific men in their sparkling progress 

 hustled a wondering world along with them, and for a time 

 all forgot that science represented only one aspect of this 

 scheme of things, and that the less important aspect. 



But only for a time. The pace is now slackening and 

 cooler judgment is returning. The problems that science 

 cannot solve are coming forward once more, as they always 

 must do, to the front. Science must vindicate itself for 

 solving the world-riddles in terms of a godless universe, a soul- 

 less body, an aimless life ! And science is dumb and helpless. 



It is not difficult to see, however, that had physical science 

 been supplemented by metaphysics, as it should be, this 

 impasse would not have been reached, but all the unanswer- 

 able questions which are now clamouring for answers would 

 have been taken to the metaphysists whose business it is to 

 answer them, For science has solved its own legitimate 

 problems, and solved them brilliantly ; it is only with the 

 problems of metaphysics that it has failed. 



It would seem, then, that for us the knowledge of most 

 worth, the knowledge that we need most to study, is meta- 

 physics. The laws of the inter-relations of. matter and energy 

 we know fairly thoroughly ; but what constitutes reality ; the 

 nature of the Soul and God ; the influence of Mind on 

 Matter — we understand hardly at all, when we need so much 

 to understand them. These latter should be — must be, now ! 

 — the subjects of human investigation ; and the results when 

 combined with our existing and ever-growing knowledge of 

 things physical will give us a conception of the Universe 

 far more likely to satisfy both the emotional and the 

 intellectual cravings of man than any extension whatever of 

 our science of to-day could do. 



And in this investigation it would be well to remember that 

 there are in India and China peoples who have been studying 

 these matters for at least twenty thousand years. Their 

 science was hoary before ours was born. It is for the 

 twentieth century to witness the meeting of East and West in 

 scientific brotherhood, on terms of mutual instruction. 



Let us then turn to the East whence cometh the light ! 



CORRESPONDENCE. 



AN IDEAL MUSEUM AND ITS GUIDE. 

 To the Editors of " Knowledge." 



Sirs, — I feel somewhat relieved to learn from the letter 

 signed by Mr. Francis Guy Laking, M.V.O., F.S.A., the 

 Keeper and Secretary to the London Museum, Kensington 

 Palace, which appears on page 93 of your March issue, 

 that he is in no way responsible for the guide. As you, 

 Sirs, rightly pointed out in your note, I had already made 

 this clear in my contribution. I must, however, express 

 surprise at the fact that the guide was never submitted to the 

 authorities, and, in the circumstances, still greater surprise 

 that these authorities yet permit the out-of-date, inaccurate, 

 and misleading guide to be sold at the museum to the public, 

 especially as these authorities are not enveloped in the 

 " entangling meshes of departmental red tape." I know of 

 no provincial curator who would permit this, and I am sorry 

 to learn that the Keeper and Secretary of this important 

 London Museum is not able to prevent it. 



I thought I had also made it clear that I was not misled by 

 the so-called guide, but my remarks were based upon an 

 actual examination of the cases and their contents. I feel 

 flattered and gratified at being asked to give any suggestion 

 for the improvement and the arrangement of the specimens in 

 this important museum, and will certainly accept the kind 

 invitation to call upon the curator the next time I am in town. 

 A PROVINCIAL CURATOR. 



THE FOURTH DIMENSION. 

 To the Editors of " Knowledge." 

 Sirs, — Mr. H. Stanley Redgrave, in a letter in your 

 February issue, expressed surprise that I did not go into 

 more detail in my reply to his statement that the existence of 

 one dimension implies that of a second, a second that of a 

 third, a third that of a fourth, and so on. I mentioned what 

 experience tells us in reference to dimensions, and pointed out 

 that there is nothing in this experience to support his state- 

 ment. In his letter in your March issue — in reply to the 

 letter of Mr. Henkel — he gives his argument in more detail, 

 so it is possible for more criticism to be made. -He asks what 

 can be the criterion of real existence which denies reality to 

 that which exists in mind. A single dimension has no real 

 existence in mind ; only the idea of it exists in mind. Our 

 knowledge of the real existence of anything must be based on 



experience, and we have no experience of one dimension 

 except in conjunction with the other two. When the mind 

 thinks about one dimension it singles out one thing from its 

 experience and directs its attention exclusively to it, but this 

 action of the mind — or the idea in the mind — does not give 

 the one dimension any independent reality, or give any support 

 to an argument that the one dimension has independent reality. 

 In reference to his statement that nobody has ever seen a 

 three-dimensional body, it may be said that though any single 

 perception cannot give the knowledge of three dimensions, 

 there are very many perceptions — of various kinds — and the 

 accumulated result is experience. Certain kinds of inductive 

 reasoning — as exemplified in his letter in your February issue 

 — may be of use when finding out algebraical laws, but it is a 

 very different thing when it is a case of finding out what is, 

 or is not, in real existence. His statement — in the letter 

 mentioned — that the existence of n dimensions implies the 

 existence of »+ 1 is of the same nature as a statement that 

 if there are 50 sheep in a meadow there must be 50+1. 

 There is no evidence in favour of the real existence of the 

 fourth dimension and no evidence against this. 



u M w JOHN JOHNSTON. 



Hendon, N.W. j j 



FOURTH DIMENSION. 

 To the Editors of " Knowledge." 



Sirs, — I do not wish to enter on a controversy with Mr. 

 Redgrove as to the nature of reality, for I am inclined to 

 sympathise largely with much of what has been said and 

 written, and the matter is one about which philosophers have 

 always differed, and I suppose will always differ, from the days 

 of Plato to those of Bergson (who by the way owes much to 

 the former, though he does not acknowledge his debt to any 

 great extent). As a "working definition" perhaps one might 

 tentatively define reality as that which exists independently 

 of any human mind perceiving it, as we conceive the 

 " material universe " to do. 



With regard to our seeing only flat surfaces apart from the 

 stereoscopic effect arising from our two eyes, I would assert 

 that without some depth (i.e., third dimension) no surface what- 

 ever would be visible. The nearest approximation, optical 

 images and excessively thin sheets of metal, (o be seen by me 

 or even distinctly conceived in my mind must have some 

 thickness as well as length and breadth, though the third 



