Aug. 8, 1884.] 



• KNOWLEDG 



103 





]AZiNE OF SCIENCE ^ 



rPmNUWORDED-EXACTUDESCRIBED 



LONDON: FRIDAY, AUG. 8, 1884. 



Contents op No. 145. 



PAGB 



The Morality of Happiness. By 



Thomas F..'ster Ill3 



The Sea Horizon. BtR. X. Prorlor HU 

 The Sense of Tasle. By Grant Allen ins 



TheOri-inot Silk 10.0 



Dreams. VI. By Edward Clodd.. 107 

 The Earth's Shape and Motions ; In- 

 troduction. Bt It. X. Proe'or ... 108 

 The Elect ro-Magnet. By W. Slingo. 109 

 The Capture Theory of Comets. By 



E. A. Proctor , , Ill 



Mind in Man and Brute. By G. J. 



Romanes 112 



Natural Gas Fuel at Pittsburg 113 



PAGB 



The Tarantula of Southern Cali- 

 fornia. (Illiif.) Ill 



Attitudes after Death. {lUus.) By 



C. E. Brown-Sequard -. llj 



Other Worlds than Ours. By M. 

 de Fontenelie. With Notes by 



Richard A. Proctor 117 



The International Health Exhibi- 

 tion. XI. Ulhit.) 118 



Editorial Gossip 121 



Our Paradox Column 121 



Correspondence 122 



Our Mathematical Colujon 123 



' Our Chess Column Vii 



THE MORALITY OF HAPPINESS. 



By Thomas Foster. 



[By an odd coincidence, the editor of Knowledge and I, Five of 

 Clubs and the author of " How to Get Strons," crossed the Atlantic 

 at one and the same time, in the steamship City of Rome. Jlyown 

 voyaiie has caused some delay in the appearance of my closing 

 paper, promised for several weeks since. 1 was unable to complete 

 it, as I had hoped, before leaving England. Buc I believe that the 

 time which I have been able to give to the consideration of that 

 general view of my subject which now alone remains to be pre- 

 sented has not been thrown away. — T. F.] 



Closing Remarks. 



IT remains only now that I should consider the general 

 conclusions toward which our discussion of the sub- 

 ject of happiness as a guide to conduct may appear to have 

 led us. 



Let me note, yet once more, that those have entirely 

 misapprehended the whole drift of this series of papers who 

 imagine, as many still seem to do, that my subject has been 

 the morality of being happv, the propriety of seeking after 

 happiness. The mistake appears so absurd, when the 

 nature of the reasoning I have advanced is considered, 

 that it would seem hardly worth while to correct it, seeing 

 that no one who could fall into such a mistake could (one 

 would imagine) in the least protit by any explanation or 

 correction. Yet the mistake has been made by several who 

 are clearly not devoid of capacity alike to render and to 

 receive a reason. I have therefore felt bound to correct it 

 as far as possible, and, as several letters recently received 

 show that the error is still entertained, I have now to 

 correct it afresh. Let me explain, then, that the object 

 of these papers has been to show what sort of moral law is 

 likely to arise, and what law appears actually to have 

 arisen and to be in progress of formation, when the guide 

 of conduct is the increase of happiness, — individual happi- 

 ness, and the happiness of those around us, with due 

 regard to the proper apportionment of altruistic and egoistic 

 happiness. I have not examined such questions as, What 

 is happiness t What kind of happiness is worthiest 1 and 

 so forth. I have taken, as included in the terra " hapjii- 

 nfss," all the various forms of pleasurable emotion of 

 which the human race is susceptible, while all the various 

 forms of painful emotion to which we are exposed have 



come naturally into consideration as aU involving greater 

 or less diminution of happiness. With the development 

 of the human race, or of any part of the human race, in one 

 direction or in another (for developmint is multiform), we 

 tind that ideas about pleasure and pain become modified in 

 various ways. And it has been a special part of our 

 suUject to consider how the lower forms of pleasure, those 

 related first to the physical gratification of self, and next 

 those related specially to self, but otherwise of higher 

 type, give place gradually to the higher gratifications 

 arising from altruistic relations. But, apart from such 

 considerations, our whole inquiry has been into the develop- 

 ment of conduct by the natural operation of those laws 

 which influence the development of happiness. 



In passing I would, however, note that the law of con- 

 duct thus considered is by no means that abstraction which 

 has been called " the happiness of the greater number," 

 according to which each person is to regard himself and to 

 be regarded as one, while the rest, being many, are to be 

 regarded as of very much greater importance. This ab- 

 straction has not and never had any value whatever, as a 

 rule of conduct, either in a man's self or in his relation to 

 others. Even if we can adopt any meaning for the word 

 happit'css as thus used, it will be found that no rational 

 way of apportioning the happiness thus regarded as a sort 

 of common property can be conceived. If the law instead 

 of being an abstraction were real and could be definitely 

 applied, it could result only in this, that each person, being 

 but one, should utterly neglect his individual welfare iu 

 favour of the general happines.=, and, as it can be readily 

 seen that no benefits he might receive from those around 

 him (obeying, we may assume, the same law) could pos- 

 sibly compensate for the direct and immediate effects of this 

 complete self-obnegation, it foUoirs that a community of 

 persons obeying this law would be a community of miser- 

 able beings ; so that obedience to this law for obtaining 

 general happiness would in reality insure universal miserj'. 



Taking concrete instead ot abstract happiness as the 

 guide of conduct, we recognise far different results. We 

 see that, though there must of necessity be a compromise 

 between egoistic satisfactions and altruistic cares, the com- 

 promise need by no means imply antagonism. Regard for 

 the welfare of others, though in its inception more or less 

 of an effort, becomes more and more spontaneous as social 

 relations develop. After spontaneity has been attained, 

 altruistic actions involve more and more of egoistic satis- 

 faction. Conversely, the care of self, which in the earlier 

 stages of social development appears to involve more or 

 less of disregard for the interests of others, becomes 

 more and more altruistic in its effect as society ad- 

 vances. Thus also we recognise the answer to what 

 at first might seem a difficulty, viz., that with the im- 

 provement of social relations the opportunity for altruistic 

 actiovis might seem likely to steadily diminish. We see 

 that the domain available for altruistic actions changes in 

 position rather than in extent ; nay, that such change of 

 extent as actually accrues is toward increase. In a society 

 where, owing to the steady improvement of the relation 

 between egoistic and altruistic interests, the number of 

 those depending for their happiness or even for their 

 existence on altruistic cares has steadily diminished, the 

 number of those who are the subject ot altruistic emotions 

 will as steadily have increased. Sympathy becomes more 

 widely extended, its development becomes surer and more 

 rapid, as its operation becomes more pleasurable, and a 

 change of this sort cannot but take place as occasions for 

 directly altruistic actions, such as arise out of pain and 

 suffering, become less frequent. 



With increased spontaneity in altruistic actions, more 



