522 



• KNOWLEDGE * 



[Dec. 26, 1884. 



OUR TWO BRAINS. 



By Eichaud A. PiiocTOR. 



(Continued from p. 479.) 



THE case of dual consciousness now to be considered is 

 a remarkable one. The original narrative of M. 

 Azam is somewhat prolix, — the following account is from an 

 article by Mi'. 11. J. Slack, in which the account has been 

 skilfully abridged. 



The sul.jtct of the disorder, Felida X , was born in 

 Bordeaux in 1843. Until the age of thirteen she differed 

 in no respect from other girls. But about that time 

 symptoms of hysterical disorder presented themselves, and 

 although i-he was free from lung-disease, she was troubled 

 with frequent s-pitting of blood. After this had continued 

 about a jear, she for the first time manifested the pheno- 

 mena of double consciousness. Sharp pains attacked both 

 temples, and in a few moments she became unconscious. 

 This lasted ten minutes, after which she opened her 

 eyes, and entered into what M. Azam calls her second 

 state, in which she remained for an hour or two, 

 after which the pains and unconsciousness came on 

 again, and she returned to her ordinary condition. 

 At iutei vals of about five or six days, such attacks 

 were repeated ; and lier relations noticed that her 

 character and conduct during her abnoimal state were 

 changed. Finding also that in her uiual condition she 

 remembered nothing which had passed when she was in the 

 other state, they thought she was becoming idiotic; and 

 presently called in M. Azam, who was connected with a 

 lunatic as)lum. Fortunately, he was not so enthusiastic a 

 student of mental aberration as to recognise a case for the 

 lunatic asylum in every instanee of phenomenal mental 

 action. He found Felida intelligeiit, but melancholy, 

 morose, and ticiturn, very industrious, and with a strong 

 ■will. She was very anxious about her bodily health. At 

 this time the mental changes occurred more frequently than 

 before. Nearly every day, as she sat with her work on her 

 knees, a violent pain shot suddenly through her temples, 

 her head dropped upon her breast, her arms fell by her 

 sides, and she passed into a sort of sleep, from which neither 

 noises, pinches, nor pricks could awaken her. This condi- 

 tion lasttd now only two or three minutes. "She woke up 

 in quite another state, smiling gaily, speaking briskly, and 

 trilling {fredonnant) over her work, which she recommenced 

 at the point where she left it. She would get up, walk 

 actively, and scarcely complained of any of the pains she 

 had suflered from so severely a few minutes before. Sbe 

 busied herself about the house, paid calls, and behaved like 

 a healthy young girl of her age. In this state she remem- 

 bered perfectly all that had happened in her two conditions." 

 (In this respect her case is distinct from both the former, 

 and is quite exceptional. In fact, the inclusion of the 

 consciousness of both conditions during the continuance of 

 one condition only, renders her case not .strictly speaking 

 one of double consciousness, the two conditions not being 

 perfectly distinct from each other.) " In this second 

 life, as in the other, her moral and intellectual 

 faculties, though different, were incontestably sound. 

 After a time (which in 1858 lasted three or four 

 hours), her gaiety disappeared, the torpor suddenly 

 ensued, and in two or three minutes she opened her 

 eyes and re-entered her ordinary life, resuming any work 

 she was engaged in just where she left off lu this 

 state she bemoaned her condition, and was quite uncon- 

 scious of what had passed in the previous state. If asked 

 to continue a ballad she had been singing, she knew 

 nothing about it, and, if she had received a visitor, she 



believed she had seen no one. The forgetfulnesa extended 

 to everything which happened during her second state, and 

 not to any ideas or information acquired before her illness." 

 Thus her early life was held in remembrance during both 

 her conditions, her consciousness in these two conditions 

 being in this respect single ; in her second or less usual 

 condition she remembered also all the events of her life, 

 including what had passed since these seizures began ; and 

 it was only in her more usual condition that a portion of 

 lier life was lost to her. — that, namely, which had passed 

 during her second condition. In 1858 a new phenomenon 

 was noticed as occasionally occurring — she would some- 

 times wake from her second condition in a fit of terror, 

 recognising no one but her husband. The terror did not 

 last long, however ; and during sixteen years of her mar- 

 ried life her husband only noticed this terror on thirty 

 occasions. 



A painful circumstance preceding her marriage somewhat 

 forcibly exhiVjited the distinction between her two states of 

 consciousness. Rigid in morality during her usual con- 

 dition, she was shocked by the insults of a brutal neigh- 

 bour, who told her of a confession made to M. Azam diuing 

 her second condition, and accused her of shamming inno- 

 cence. The attack — unfortunately but too well founded as 

 far as facts were concerned — brought on violent convulsions, 

 which required medical attendance during two or three 

 hours. It is important to notice the difference thus indicated 

 between the character of the personalities corresponding to 

 her two conditions. " Her moral faculties," says M. Azam, 

 " were incontestably sound in her second life, though dif- 

 ferent," — by which, be it understood, he means simply that 

 her sense of right and wrong was just during her second 

 condition, not, of course, that her conduct was irreproachable. 

 She was in this condition, as in the other, altogether respon- 

 sible for her actions. But her power of self-control, or rather 

 perhaps the relative power of her will as compared with 

 tendencies to wrong-doing, was manifestly weaker during 

 her second condition. In fact, in one condition she was 

 ojipressed and saddened by pain and anxiety, whereas in the 

 other she was almost free from pain, gay, light-hearted, and 

 hopeful. Kow I cannot altogether agree with Mr. Slack's 

 remark, tbat if, during her second state, "she had committed 

 a robbery or an assassination, no moral responsibility could 

 have been assumed to rest upon her with any certainty, by 

 any one acquainted with her history,'' for her moral faculties 

 in her second condition being incontestably sound, she was 

 clearly responsible for her actions while in that condition. 

 But certainly, the question of punishment for such an offence 

 would be not a little complicated by her twofold personality. 

 To the woman in her ordinary condition, remembering 

 nothing of the crime committed (on the supposition we are 

 dealing with), in her abnormal condition, punishment for 

 that crime would certainly seem unjust, seeing that ber 

 liability to enter into that condition had not in any degree 

 depended on her own will. The drunkard who, waking in 

 the morning with no recollection of the events of the past 

 night, finds himself in gaol for some crime committed during 

 that time, although he may think the punishment he has to 

 endure severe measure for a crime of which in his ordinary 

 condition he is incapable, knowsat least that he is respon- 

 sible for placing himself under that influence which made 

 the crime possible. Supjjosing even he had not had suf- 

 ficient experience of his own character when under the 

 influence of liquor, to have reason to fear he might be guilty 

 of the ofl'euce, he yet perceives that to make intoxication 

 under any circumstances an excuse for crime would be most 

 dangerous to the community, and that he suffers punishment 

 justly. But the case of dual consciousness is altogether 

 different, and certainly where responsibility exists under both 



