j-AK, 30, is?r«.] 



♦ KNOWLEDGE ♦ 



acoordirg to wLich God has (in i^eneral) chosen to exercise His 

 will ; and wc may leiritiuiately call anything an accident when it is the 

 result of the exercise cf a man's will on liis smroundirgs, but which 

 was not intended I'V him. 1 can see no real objection to these 

 phrases, even in the mouth of one who bclicTcs that nothing happens 

 without the will of God. Ax Eabxkst Tiunkek. 



[It is to be regretted that our correspondent is not a careful, 

 accurate, and logical thinker, as well as an " earnest" one. Mr. 

 Clodd has never for a single instant asserted that any " jihilosopher 

 in ancient or modern times, who has believed in a soul, has rested 

 his belief in dreams." That the remote and savage progenitor of 

 that philosopher did so is a very different thing indeed. Moreover, 

 the " Thinker" (?) trespasses so on the confines of Theology that my 

 first impulse was to exclude his letter altogether; and 1 only ulti- 

 mately decided to insert it to show the strangely inconsequential 

 kind of declamation which some people mistake for argument. 

 What becomes of '" the uniformity of the laws of nature " if wc are 

 to accept the definition of an accident contained in "An Earnest 

 Thinker's" percration, I rather fail to see. — Ed.] 



'OCE TWO BRAINS." 



[1575] — How is it possible to prove another unconscious? I 

 only remember one occasion, except durirg sleep, on which I was 

 unconscious for any period of time. I was about twelve years old, 

 and was playing cricket on the Brighton Downs. A ball was hit 

 down a very steep hill, and in running after it I trip])cd up, and, 

 f.alling heavily, was stunned. As I did not get up immediately, two 

 of my companions came to my assistance, and. finding I had rather 

 damaged my limbs, helped me up the hill. Meanwhile play was 

 -■■topped, and we all walked homewards. When about a mile on 

 the road thither 1 suddenly came to my senses and asked where I 

 was, to the surprise of my companions, who had not had , the 

 slightest idea I had been utcor.scious. They say I had talked the 

 whole time perfectly reasonably. I often wonder, if I had remained 

 unconscioufl, whether any one would have found it out. 



In the cases lately recorded in K.nowledge in the papers on 

 " Our Two Braiiis," as dual consciousness, is there any proof that 

 in the abnormal state the subject is conscious ? Let us take the 

 case of the boy at Netting Hill. It is true he acts as if he were 

 conscious, but when he comes to what may be considered his ordi- 

 nary stale of consciousness, he seems to be exactly in the same 

 state as the man, who, recovciing from the effects of an anaes- 

 thetic, under which he cried out he was being hurt, says he felt 

 nothing. As the abnormal life of the boy only lasted about a 

 couple of hours every day, it must have been a very peculiar one. 

 Fancy life without breakfast or five o'clock tea, and dinner only 

 occasionally ! 



But, turning to tlie case of Sergeant F., we find that for three 

 weeks after hia accident he was unconscious ; unable, I suppose, to 

 speak or move. Then for three months he was conscious, and in 

 his normal mental condition, but paralysed. But at the end of 

 these three months an abnormal state occasionally takes the place 

 of the normal mental condition. The left brain has been injui-ed 

 sufficiently to cause pai'alysis of the right side, which at this time 

 still continued, but, according to the " two-brain theory," it is suffi- 

 ciently sound to do all the brain-work done during the abnormal state. 

 Surely it is the right brain acting abnormally which produces these 

 abnormal results. It is a well-known physiological rule that 

 in all dnal organs should one half become diseased or useless, the 

 other half gradually takes up its work, and this is probably true of 

 the brain. It seems to me a fatal objection to the "two brain 

 theory" that in some cases, which it seems to explain, the two 

 brains act like buckets at a well — one in and one out. Even if the 

 right brain should suddenly become ineffective, why should the left 

 brain almost immediately begin to act ? Why should the left brain 

 cease to act when the right brain recommences ? Would not 

 occasions frequently arise when both brains vrould act together, 

 when the events of both lives would be remembered 

 at the same time ? I mean especially in such cases as that 

 of the boy at Notting-hill. Even taking for granted that the 

 left brain regulates the actions of the right side, and cice- 

 rersa, is it necessary to suppose we are conscious of sens.itions on 

 the right side in the left brain, and of those on the left side in the 

 right ? Is not consciousness the sum total of all the sensations 

 recorded by every part of the brain ? and if wc admit a separate 

 consciousness for each half of the brain, is there any reason why 

 we should not divide the brain up into fifty parts, and admit a 

 separate consciousness for each part ? After severe mental work 

 in India, my right side frequently went what is called to sleep; but 

 I was quite as conscious that my right side was asleep as that my 

 left side was not. The drunken man's double vision is sometimes 

 explained by the " two brain theory ; " but does not the drunken 

 man really see two moons ? I see colours different shades with 



each eye. Could 1 tell the difference if dual consciousness osisted 

 in my brain? 



During a voyage to Australia, a well-known Australian clergyman 

 toUl mo the following story. I give it for what it is worth. A 

 German of his acquaintance was very subjict to seeing apparitions, 

 and so real did these apparitions seem, that, unless they were 

 within reach, the observer could not tell whether real persons were 

 present or not, until he discovered that, if l:o squinted, the real 

 persons appeared double and the apparitions single. 



Lastly, let us turn to the case of Felida X.. Knowleroe, Vol. VI., 

 p. 522. " During her normal condition, Felida X. remembers nothing 

 that happens during her abnormal condition ; but, during the 

 abnormal state, she remembers her whole life. Is not this what 

 happens during certain states of intoxication ? Policeman X. (not 

 Felida X.) reports that the prisoner was quarrelling with another 

 man when taken into custody. Ho was extremely violent on his 

 way to the station, and swore terribly, but gave his right name and 

 address. The ju-isoner told the magistrate he was extremely sorry 

 for what had occurred, but ho recollected nothing at all about the 

 circumstances. Some friend.s bad pressed him to take a glass of 

 whif-ky, and Icing a teetotaller, it had gone to his head. Ho also 

 tendered evidence that he was naturally ([uiet and well-behaved. 

 Tlie magistrate, however, fined him 5s., and did not seem to think 

 dual consciousness necessary to explain his case. 



F. W. U., in Knowi.edoe-, Vol. VI., p. 3U5, says, " It often 

 happens when men are severely injured they are unconscious ; 

 soulless for weeks and mouths ; that whole time is a perfect, entire 

 blank to them when consciousness returns, although all other life 

 functions went on ns usual. All this appears to point to the same 

 conclusion, that soul and mind are functions of the brain and 

 nerves, which cease with death." With this 1 quite agree, except 

 that con.'sciousuess (soul *) is not a function of the brain. It; seems 

 to me that consciousness is no more a function of the brain than 

 the image in a looking-glass is a function of the object reflected. 

 Can "F. W. H." express consciousness in foot pounds? Does 

 consciousness consume any of the beef and mutton I eat ? Of 

 course, brain work does. Jos. W. Alexandek. 



A HUMAN AUTOMATON. 



[1-576] — Till recently a small carriage-clock stood on a shelf in a 

 bookcase in my lodgings. It was my daily practice to wind the 

 clock up, open the glass door of the bookcase (which closed itself 

 when the clock was taken down), and replace the clock on its shelf. 

 About four weeks ago the clock was permanently removed to the 

 mantelpiece on the other side of the room, and I believe I have not 

 wound it up since, although 1 have frequently looked at it for the 

 time. To-day (Sunday), however, I took the clock down, set it 

 right, and wound it. Then, instead of replacing the clock on 

 the mantelpiece, I did, unconsciously, what I have done a hundred 

 times before under the same circumstances (i.e., after winding it 

 up) ; I opened the glass door of the bookcase, placed the clock 

 exactly in its old position on the shelf, closed the door again, and 

 left it. In a very few minutes I was asked the time; again, 

 without thinking, I looked to the mantelpiece, as I have always 

 done, under similar circumstances, for the past four weeks. Then 

 I first discovered where I put the clock. Given stimuli produced 

 given effects on the brain and nerves in both instances. " Was I 

 not in the condition of one of Vaucanson's automata— a mechanism 

 worked by molecular changes on' the nervous system ? " 



My attention was particularly attracted )jy these facts, after 

 reading Mr. Proctor's last ijubliehcd instalment of "Our Two 

 Brains" (No. 117) and Miss Ballin's first of "Thought and 

 Language." The intelligence of the dog which associated feolmgs 

 of satisfaction (arising from the consumption of biscuits) with the 

 appearance of a decanter or glasses of sherry, seems to form a link 

 between the mind of the ordinary human being on the one hand, and 

 pure automata, like Dr. Mesnet's soldier or myself in the instances 

 I have noted. W. A. E. 



A NEW CLOCK-FACE. 



[1577]' — From the increasing interest taken in the question of 

 deciding what should be the style of clock-dial for the future, the 

 enclosed novelty may be interesting to you. 



Experiments extending over many years have proved to us that 

 numerals, whether Roman or Arabic, are a hindrance rather than 

 an assistance in ascertaining the time with accuracy at an dis- 

 tance, and therefore, in place of these, we substitute plain marks 

 or divisions, the width of each being equal to some factor of the 

 circumference of the divisional circle. 



In order to show that the boundaries of the hours do not require 



* According to " F. W. H." But volition and consciousness are 

 not exactly identical. 



