FEa G, 1885.] 



KNOWLEDGE ♦ 



101 



receives from them, and thus is c>.ntinually cooling down 

 in proportion to the amount of the diflerence and the degree 

 of free exposure. We accordingly tind that all the warm- 

 blooded animals are supplied with special organic arrange- 

 ments for checking this radiation. 



Those moit ncaily allied to ourselves are covered with 

 hair or wool ; birds are well clad with feathers ; and the 

 wariu-blooded animals that live wholly or paitialiy in the 

 sea — the whales, dol])hin9, porpoises, itc, and the seals — 

 are enveloped in a tight fitting overcoat of blubber, au 

 enveloping layer of fat iuipenucable by the water, and a 

 very etTective resister of the passage of heat. 



Even ourselves aie not absulutely naked, for besides an 

 insignificant supply of hair we are enveloped in a thin 

 overcoat of cuticle, which encloses more or less if fat that 

 acts like the blulibf r of the seals acd whales in clucking 

 the radiation of our animal heat. 



I may add that this bfneticent endowment of fat varies 

 to some exttiit with the climate, but by ijo means sufii- 

 ciently to put us on a level with the fur-clad animals. 



Our enveloping cuticle, like the hair and nails that are 

 connected with it as structural modifications of develop- 

 ments of itself, is passive and insensible, may fairly be 

 regarded as a mere protecting envelope to the dt-rmis or 

 " true skin " below it, which true skin is the seat of the 

 vital skin functions. I shall, therefore, regard this cuticle 

 as our natural clothintr, or that which we merely supple- 

 ment by artificial clothing, and describe it first as ilie model 

 clothing of nature which art should strive to imitate. 



According to this view of the subject, the artificial 

 clothing with which we cover the cuticle should bear 

 as nearly as possible the same relation to the cuticle 

 that the cuticle bears to the cutis. It should protect the 

 cuticle as the cuticle protects the cutis ; it should, at the 

 same time, permit the transpiration, respiration, and other 

 functions carried on through the cuticle to be carried 

 further and similarly through the artificial garments by 

 devices as nearly similar as the nature of the problem and 

 the feebleness of our arts permit. 



An examination of the structure of the cuticle is, there- 

 fore, a first step in this exposition of the Philosophy of 

 Clothing. 



OUR TWO BRAINS. 



By RicuARD A. Proctor. 



(Continued from p. 63.) 



THE most important of all the questions depending on 

 dual consciousness is one into which I could not 

 properly enttr at ai.y length in these pages — the ques- 

 tion, namely, of the relation between the condition of the 

 brain and responsiVjility, whether such rcsponsiljility be 

 considered with reference to human laws or to a higher 

 and all-knowing tribunal. But theie are some points not 

 wanting in interest which may be here more properly 

 considered. 



In the first place it is to be noticed that a person who 

 has passed into a state of aVjnormal corsciousnes.", or who is 

 in the habit of doing so, can have no knowledge of the fact 

 in his normal coijdition except from the information of 

 others. The hov at Norwood might be told of what he had 

 said and d<ine while in his less usual condition, but so far as 

 any experience of his own was concerned, he might during 

 all that time have lieen in a profound sleep, feiriii'arly of 

 all the other cases. So that we have here the singular cir- 

 cumstance to consider, that a person may have to depend 

 on the iuf.rmation of others respecting his own baliaviour — 

 not during sleep or mental aberration or ordinary absence 



of mind — but (in some casts at least) whiliMn possession 

 of all liis fncuhies and uiKjuistionalily rcsponi-iblo for his 

 actions. Not only might a person find liiinsi'lf thus held 

 rcsi)onsible for action.s of wliiih he had no knowKdge, and 

 perhaps undeservedly blam( d or condemnecl, but ho might 

 find himself regard( d as untinthful because of his perfectly 

 honest denial of all knowledge of the conduct attributed 

 to him. If such cases were common, again, it would not 

 improbably happen that the simulation of dual conscious- 

 ness would become a frequent nuans of attempting to 

 evade responsibility. 



Another curious point to be noticed is this. Supposintj 

 one sulject to alternations of consciousness were told that 

 in his abnormal condition he sulFired intense pain or mental 

 anguish in consecjuence of ])artic;ular actions during his 

 norn.al state, how tar would ho be inlluenced to refrain from 

 such actions by the fear of causing pain or sorrow to his 

 " double," a being of whoso pains and sorrows, nay, of 

 whose very existence, he was unconscious 1 In ordinary 

 lite a man refrains fiom particular actions wliich have been 

 followed by unpleasant consequences, reasoning, in some 

 cases, " I will not do so-and-so, because I sullered on such 

 and snch occasions when I did so " (we set religious cnn- 

 sidera'ions entirely on one side by assuuiing that the par- 

 ticular actions are ijot contrary to any moral law), in others, 

 "I will not do so and-so because my so doing i^n f. rmer 

 occasions has caused trouble to my fiiend A or B ; " but it 

 is strange to imagine any one rt asnning, " I will not do so- 

 and-so because my so doing on former occasions has caused 

 my second self to experience pain and anguish, of which 1 

 myself have not the slightest recollection." A man may 

 care for his own well being, or be unwilling to bring trouble 

 on his friends, but who is that second Stlf that his troubles 

 shall excite the sympathy ot his fellow consciousness 1 The 

 considerations here touched on are not so tntirely beyond 

 ordinary experience as iriij;lit be supposed. It may happen 

 to any man to have occasion to enter into an apparently 

 unconscious condition duiing which in reality severe pains 

 may be sufl'. red by another self, though on his return to 

 his orilinary conditinn no recollection of those pains may 

 remain, and though to all appearance he has bteii all the 

 time in a state of alisolute stupor ; and it may be a reason- 

 aVile question, not perhaps whether he or his double shall 

 suffer such pains, but whether the body which both inhabit 

 will suffer while lie is unconscious, or while that other con- 

 sciousness comes into existence. That this is no imaginary 

 supposition is shown V>y several cases in Abercrombie's 

 treatise on the " lutelleciual Powers." Take, for instance, 

 the following narrative: — "A bi.y," he tells u.o, "at the 

 age of four suffered fracture of the skull, for which he 

 underwent the operation of the trepan. He was at the 

 time in a state of jierfect stupor, and after his recovery 

 retained no recollection either of the accident or of the 

 operation. At the age of fifteen, however, during the 

 delirium of fever, he gave his moths r an account of the 

 operation, and the persons who were present at it, with a 

 correct description of their dress, and other minute par- 

 ticulars. He had never been observed to allude to it 

 before; and no means were known by which he could have 

 acquired the circumstances which he mentioned." Suppose 

 one day a jjcrson in the delirium of fever or under some 

 other exciting cause should describe the tortures expeiieiced 

 during sr.me operation, when, undtr the infiuence of ana'S- 

 thetics, he had app'ared to all around to be totally un- 

 conscious, dwelling in a special manner perhaps on the 

 horror of jiains accompanied by utter powerlessuess to 

 shriik or groan, or even to move; how far would the 

 possibilities suggested by such a narrative infiuence one 

 who had a painful operation to undergo, knowing, as he 



