202 



KNOWLEDGE 



[March G, 1885. 





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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INSTINCT. 



[lG21]~Mr. H. F. Osborne, in liis letter [No. IGOO], objects to 

 my definition of instinct as being too wide, i'.*"., it includes excito- 

 Motor or reflex actions. I quite agree that in instinctive actions, 

 commonly so-called, there is an clement of consciousness ; but it is 

 merely the organic feeling of the impression produced on the 

 sensory nerve — that is all. In reflex actions there is no conscious- 

 ness at all ; and this is the only intellectual difference between the 

 two classes of movements. Hartmann, however, opines that in 

 instinct there is " a conscious adaptation to a particular end, with- 

 out knowledge of what that end is." There may be a conscious 

 collocation of movements, but certainly not a conscious ada^jtafioii 

 of movements, if the end of those movements be unknown. , No 

 one could possibly invent a machine, if the aim or function of that 

 machine be not before the mind ; therefore the proper intellectual 

 element (association of ideas or inherited habit) which guides 

 instinctive action is, as it were, unconscious ; and, consequently, 

 so far as this element is concerned, the definition of instinct will 

 cover actions purely reflex. 



Then, .again, your correspondent avers, that "What was once a 

 conscious action may have deteriorated into an instinct, or even 

 into a reflex action." I expressly maintain, on the otlierhand, that 

 any action which cannot be performed without the guidance cf a 

 general notion, can never become instinctive or reflex. It is incon- 

 testible that some actions (such as walking, &c.), having their origin 

 in a slow and painful education, ultimately become instinctive — 

 i.e., the various movements which compose these actions are, after 

 a time, collocated unconsciously. It must be particularly observed, 

 however, that these actions are organic or belong to animal life ; 

 they are guided by concrete (not by general) notions, and they are 

 not concerned in the production of effects altogether outside or in- 

 dependently of the animal itself and its functions. The wondrous 

 architectural talents of bees, ants, and birds originated, I believe, 

 in the dictation of individual experience. Actions guided by general 

 ideas are incapable of organic transmission to posterity. 



P. Q. Kegan. 



[1622] — Your correspondent, "A. F. OsViorne," in his letter 

 (1597), counsels progression backwards. " Such incpiiries as these 

 into the union of mind and body belong to the realm of meta- 

 physics, not that of physics." He does not seem to have grasped 

 the facts (1) that metaphysics has for centuries tried its hand at 

 solving such inquiries, and has failed ; and (2) that all the brilliant 

 discoveries as to the true physiology of mind as a brain function 

 have been made during a comparatively recent period, and have 

 been reached by purely physical methods of research — in fact, by 

 regarding mental phenomena as physical phenomena, using physical, 

 in its largest sense, as natural (i/xVic). As well abandon modern 

 astronomy for astrology, chemistry for alchemy, as go back to 

 metaphj-sics for information on what is really a physical problem. 



" From a scientific point of viow, we must always remain in 

 absolute ignorance as to the true nature of the soul." A truism 

 equally correct when applied to electricity. We call it a "fluid," 

 bat, from a scientific point of view, we must always remain in 

 absolute ignorance as to its true nature. We do not on that 

 account, liowever, relegate the study of its phenomena to the realm 

 of metaphysics. 



A small hajmorrhage disorganises, a splinter of bone causes 

 pressure on a limited portion of brain substance. Mark the 



results : — (1) Muscular movement and sensation are paralysed 

 over a definite area of the body; arm or leg, or both, are motion- 

 less and devoid of feeling — practically dead. (2) Consciousness is 

 abolished for the time being, thought is impossible, emotion un- 

 felt, volition extinct. All evidence of a living soul is absent ; it is 

 practically dead, as much as the phj'sical properties of motilityand 

 sensation. Now the cause of the two conditions is precisely the 

 same. Will it be maintained with respect to one and the self -same 

 injury that inquiry as to its mode of causation of paralysis of 

 motion and sensation belongs to the realms of physics, but that 

 inquiry as to its mode of causation of paralysis of thought and 

 consciousness belongs to that of metaphysics ? Yet this is the 

 logical proceeding to which Mr. Osborne's argument would 

 commit us. 



The connection of mind and body is eminently a physical question, 

 at any rate from the body side. Any knowledge we posses worth 

 having on this subject is the fruit of modern scientific psychology 

 and biology in general. To go back to metaphysics for further 

 enlightenment would be an endeavour to explain ifinotnm per 

 ignolius, and to exchange broad daylight for a veritable will-o'-the- 

 wisp. 



Science regards the whole of Nature as an " open secret." To 

 aid in exploring its arcana and unravelling its intricacies all her 

 sous are invited. The intervention of priest or high priest is 

 superfluous. No sanctum sanctorum is acknowledged, with entrance 

 granted only to a favoured few. All workers are welcome, and 

 none who honestly labour are sent empty away. Ganglion". 



OMNIPOTENCE AND FKEE-WILL. 



[1623] — Letter 1593, in your issue of Feb. 20, is a gem of 

 reasoning too brilliant to be passed by unheeded. 



The argument of the writer there is that, given an almighty will, 

 it is possible for such a will " to will that there shall be beings who 

 shall have a will of their own." This is a truism which none will 

 dispute. What " F. W. H." and all reasoning men do dispute is 

 that it is possible for an almighty will to co-exist with a distinct 

 free-will. 



Given an alniig'aty will, then no act — not even self-destruction — 

 is impossible to it ; but if, in the exercise of its power, it destroys 

 itself, it is then not only not almighty, but not at all. Similarly, if 

 it limits itself " by the creation of beings gifted with a power of 

 free-will," from the moment of such creation its almightinesa ceases 

 to exist. 



It is pitiful to know that William Fitzgerald is a representative 

 of a large class of men who hold on to such straws as this, without 

 apparently a doubt as to their stability ; and, quite content that by 

 such sophistry they are able to reconcile theii- reason with their 

 adopted theory of human life, are constantly to be heard, when 

 expounding this theory, using terms mutually contradictory in a 

 fashion which makes a hearer wonder however their brains are 

 convoluted. Teebor Rolvat. 



[1024] — I am sorry I should be called upon to show the truth of 

 a" truism" which to me seems so obvious. If I grant the exist- 

 ence of an " .all "-mighty will, that implies to me a will which 

 controls, directs, has power over " all " other wills. Equally a 

 " free" will implies to me a will which is " free entirely," i.e., not 

 controlled, directed, influenced by any other will or power, but its 

 own inherent one. If Mr. i^itzgerald can think or imagine two 

 such wills existing side by side, he can do what seems to me im- 

 possible. I cannot even think of "all-mightiness" doing impos- 

 sibilities, since if impossibilities can be done, they cease to be 

 impossibilities. 



In reply to "Eyewitness," letter 1595. I certainly expectany- 

 body who tells me that his body and his soul are not one and in- 

 divisible, but two distinct entities, and that soul, thought, con- 

 sciousness, are not functions of his living, normal brain, but an 

 entity distinct from it, to tell me what becomes of this entity 

 when the brain ceases its work or ceases to live, and where this 

 entitj' was before his brain came to perfectiou or birth, and would 

 also like him to tell me how an " immortal " thing can have birth 

 or origin ? If Mr. Alexander wished to make a comparison, not 

 a small joke, he might have said, where is the "light" when it is 

 blown out ? To which I reply, exactly where his soul will be when 

 consciousness or life is gone out. F. W. H. 



[This discussion, drifting nearer and nearer to the confines of a 

 purely theological one, must now cease. — Ed.] 



MIND AND BIIAIK. 



[1625] — In the four months which have elapsed since the publi- 

 cation of Mr. Jones's first letter upon this subject (1441), he seems 

 to have forgotten what his original contention was. Stated briefly 



