530 



♦ KNOWLEDGE 



[June 19, 18S5. 



existence, the present accepted theories of light and soand are 

 inadequate to explain the facts. If, on the other hand, the theories 

 are correct, then colour and sound are products of oar inner nature, 

 are sensations that cannot be explained. The same reasoning may 

 be appUed to the sensations of heat, cold, Ac, &c. 



Do not seek, then, to destroy people's reverence, do not rob the 

 world of hope, do not deprive men of all that sanctifies endeavour — 

 of a belief in that supreme rule which alone constitutes right and 

 wrong, and which alone affords any valid reason against a man 

 doing just as he chooses. iltxEE. 



ULTRA-GAS. 



[1760]— This (" F. W. H." 1733) has nothing to do with the 

 old guesses about ether, luminous fluid, &c. 



Starting from the (recent ?) discovery that the attraction of 

 gaseous particles for each other is insignificant : seeing that that is 

 the case also with the fixed stars reciprocally : I said, What if they 

 are the molecules of a universal gas ? In that case there would be 

 between them, not ether, &c, but absolute void. But what then is 

 the gas ? 



The molecules of an ether would be even smaller than those of 

 hydrogen. I suggest a gas of which the sun would be a very small 

 molecule. This idea (certainly large) seems to have been too bulky 

 for comprehension. Hallyaeds. 



IDEALISM. 

 [1761]— In reply to "J. S." (1738), let me say that I do not 

 "assume the non-correspondence of concepts with the things con- 

 ceived." If by " thing " "J. S." means " object " — i.e., a group or 

 synthesis of sensations— then every valid "concept" must cer- 

 tainty be correspondent with a " thing." But unless the " thing" 

 be an " object " as above defined, " correspondence," in the sense 

 of similarity, becomes a meaningless predicate. Xo concept can 

 possibly resemble a hypothetical cause of sensation, which in itself 

 is neither sensation nor thought. C. X. 



MEMORY AND IMMORTALITY. 

 [1762] -Tient a letter, 1732, by Mr. R. S. Stanley, the "cer- 

 tainty " of the immortality of the " soul " is rested upon the fact 

 of an old lady recollecting things she had forgotten for a long time. 

 Is this not a proof, on the contrary, that " soul" is not an " entity," 

 but action partly conscious, partly unconscious, voluntary or invo- 

 luntary of the brain ? I have often repeatedly endeavoured to 

 recollect things of "great importance" without being able to do 

 so, while at the same moment most trivial occurrences came to my 

 memory without effort. I have seen several friends die of old age 

 who became shortly before death perfectly childish, one of them 

 Almost idiotic, in action and speech, representing to' me the 

 gradual fading away of the power of thinking, loss of memorv, and 

 will. If, then, the soul, mind, thought be immortal — i.e., inde- 

 pendent of otir bodies, which we know decay and are absorbed in 

 nature's great reservoir, what state will it be in, the child's, youth, 

 adult, or senile old age r F. W'. H. 



EARLY MEMORIES. 



[17G3j — I quite agree with you [note on letter 1732] that an old 

 person remembering an old circumstance, even long forgotten, can 

 have no influence on the question whether we have a soul, or, if so, 

 whether it is eternal. Tltat no created thing ever can know. Were 

 we all enjoying a happy eternity, some sceptical or downcast spirit 

 would be sure to suggest " How do we all know it will last for 

 ever"? To the most pious believer the reflection can hardly fail 

 to occur " Is not the violent repugnance we all have to coming to 

 an end a too, too likely origin of the hope that we never shall ? Is 

 not the foul injustice, and the useless pain we suffer here a certain 

 cause of the trust that in some other state right will be meted to 

 us for wrong, bliss for pain ? " I myself never felt this reasoning 

 so strongly as when I thirsted for an occasion of martyrdom. I 

 never could sympathise with the cock-sure. 



Your souvenirs of your third year remind me of the question, 

 Why do we remember certain things — mere trifles — and not great 

 things, which happened at the same time or later r I asked my 

 mother once how eld I was when a kitten fell into our hall and 

 broke its spine. She said it was ivipossihle I could remember it — 

 because I was only eighteen months old. Yet I do remember the 

 position in the hall of all the persons there — that I understood 

 what they said, and was vexed I could not join (I said my first 

 word a month or so after) — Now, my horror at the poor kitten's 

 fate accounts for this being my first memory — (Would a child, as 

 soon as old enough to swear, be received as sole witness of a murder 

 he had seen committed, but could not divulge at the time, not 



knowing any speech ?) — But why should I remember still more 

 distinctly plucking potato-apples in the garden one fine day, very 

 hot, running through the house, and throwing them into a pond ? 

 That happened when I was just two, and is fixed by my recollection 

 that my father was seriously iU. Yet it is a circumstance of no 

 importance. I remember when confined by a bar at table thinking 

 my aunt dreadfully affected because she said " Is it not? " whereas 

 we more commonly heard *' Isn't it ? " 



Many of our childish memories are perhaps like Mr. Galton's 

 composite photographs — they are the concrete result of acts fre- 

 quently repeated. Thus, I recall piano, violoncello, and glees ; but 

 I do not think I remember any one occasion of these family concerts. 

 I remember the Queen's accession, when I was not yet five, 

 because there were minute-bells all one day, peals all the next ; 

 but, strange to say, I do not remember my eldest uncle's death in 

 the same year, though it was a much more important event to ug. 

 I remember how I learned the word " son." I woke up one 

 evening (it was still daylight, and I was still " the baby " — so I 

 must have been not older than three months under three) 

 screaming violently, in the greatest agony. Everybody rushed 

 upstairs, and I heard my mother cry on coming " Oh, my son, my 

 son ! " Strange to say, in spite of my sore plight I was interested 

 still to learn that I stood in that relation to her. I had never 

 heard the word " son " and thought it a " prow title." I had been 

 seized by a spasm in the throat, rendering respiration all but 

 impossible. My mother was frequently in danger of sudden death 

 from this ; but (curious fact) I never had any such thing save that 

 once (though probably I shall have yet). Hallyakds. 



IS THOUGHT AX EXTITY? 



[176i] — One may so far agree with Haeckel, Buchner, and 

 '■other eminent German scientists " as to admit (what, indeed, 

 science shows to be a mere truism) that the mind is a function of 

 the brain, and not an independent entity, without following those 

 "extreme" Materialists into the domain of dogmatic negation. It 

 may be said that man cannot get beyond phenomena, and that the 

 force behind nature is an unknown quantity, but in that unknown 

 force is comprised the whole solution of the problem of existence ; 

 but Materialists of the school above mentioned treat the unknown 

 quantity as though it were no factor at all in the case. 



" F. W. H.'s " simile of thought being comparable to the scent of 

 a flower or the reflection of an object in a glass is unsatisfactory 

 for the simple reason given by John Stuart Mill, that " mind (or 

 whatever name we give to what is implied in consciousness of a 

 continued series of feelings) is, in a philosophical point of view, 

 the only reality of which we have any evidence, and no analogy 

 can be recognised or comparison made between it and other reali- 

 ties, because there are no other known realities to compare it with." 

 If the simile holds good, it can only be so far that the scent corre- 

 lates the impressions formed by the mind, to which expression is 

 given. '■ Thought, mind, or soul," says " F. W. H." " must be the 

 evect of stimuli acting on living, self-acting brain." If he means 

 that (in the words of Montaigne) man is not here to work, but to 

 be I'.orked vpon, 1 agree in the sense that we all fulfil the law of 

 our being. But why regard soul as perishable when the atoms of 

 matter are imperishable ? soul being the intangible, yet real, 

 force of every living organism, just as the oversold is of the 

 universe. H. A. Bclley. 



GEORGE ELIOT SETTLING IT. 



[1705] — Without dealing here with " Commentator's " prelimi- 

 nary rhodomontade about George Eliot, except to point out to him 

 that the value of any one's work and scientific opinions is not 

 usually estimated according to their moral conduct and opinions, 

 might I ask him to give scientific proof of his assertion that 

 " Matter aZiroys was and aluays will he?" Surely upon such a 

 question as this, which must be always beyond man's ken, he shows 

 too much of that " cock sureness " which he finds so repulsive in 

 George Eliot. 



Secondly, let "Commentator" prove the "fact of apparitions 

 after death," before he asks for an explanation of such fact (?). 



A. FOUNTAIX. 



EVOLUTION. 

 [1766] — " Commentator's " protest against " conventional evolu- 

 tion " will meet with considerable sympathy from a large circle of 

 careful thinkers. The Darwinian hypothesis is now passing through 

 a most Jinscientific phase of its existence. Having started upon a 

 splendid structure of fact, it is now endeavouring to win fresh 

 domains upon such poor stuffs as "may he's" and " possibly's." 

 Every Darwinian enthusiast seems anxious to show how plastic 

 the theory is, and how it can be made to cover nearly everything. 



