44 HEREDITY. 



est to justice to hold all men as morally respon- 

 sible for their conduct in the eyes of the law. 



The doctrine of the absolute freedom of the 

 human will in all men is without foundation in 

 fact. Man is not without his limitations in any 

 direction. Man is free to do the best he can, 

 yet some are capable of doing much better than 

 others. A man should therefore be credited or 

 condemned not for what he does or fails to do. 



but for doin or failin to do his best - The 

 strongest argument in favor of the moral respon- 

 sibility of the average man is found in the fact 

 that when he does wrong he is conscious that 

 he did not have to. The last step in vice or crime 

 is often imperative; the first step is invariably 

 one of choice. The responsibility, therefore, is 

 to be reckoned not by the final conduct, but by 

 the first choice. An inebriate may not be to 

 blame for homicide committed while crazed with 

 liquor; he is to blame for forming the habit of 

 drinking. 



Waving aside all further consideration of man's 

 moral responsibility, or the freedom of the human 

 will, the fact that concerns us in this connection 

 is that man is as responsible morally for con- 

 Hereditary duct springing from heredity as from acquired 

 Tendencies may tendencies, because both are subject to the control 

 Controlled. ^ the ^ . f t ^ t power is exercised at the ap- 

 proach of temptation. The fact that a man has 

 a tendency toward mechanics does not necessi- 

 tate his becoming a mechanic; it only inclines 

 him in that direction and makes it easy for him 

 to become a mechanic, but it does not compel him 

 to follow mechanics for a livelihood. In like 



