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It must admit the material world, with its laws, as a purely 

 phenomenal existence, and this admission enables us to see 

 that the opposition between the materialistic and idealistic 

 theories is by no means so radical as it would at first appear, 

 and that there is a possible reconciliation between the two. 

 Schopenhauer and his following believe that " there are two 

 di- tinct modes of existence ; the noumenon in the will, and 

 the phenomenon in the intellect and in nature. To the 

 mind, regarded as noumenon, none of our conceptions of 

 laws, logical necessity, or categories, are applicable, for all 

 this only pertains to the mind considered as phenomenon. 

 Consequently, since we restrict ourselves to the study of 

 experience that is to say, of facts and their laws there can 

 be no disagreement between us and the idealists. The differ- 

 ence between us springs, not from any diametrical opposition 

 of doctrine, but from the fact that to the study of pheno- 

 mena, which both sides pursue, and to which we strictly 

 confine ourselves, the idealist joins a metaphysical theory, 

 which, in our eyes, has no scientific value, since it tran- 

 scends science. ... If the idealist admits, as he does, 

 that in the order of physical, chemical, physiological, and 

 psychological facts there are co-existences and sequences 

 that can be reduced to fixed formulas, he has no fair 

 ground for refusing to concede to heredity a place among 

 these empiric laws, though he may deny that it applies 

 to the intellect considered as noumenon." The real nature 

 of thought itself baffles all scientific definition ; for 

 "although it explains all things, it does not explain itself;" 

 although, by its means, we may be enabled to solve the 

 mystery of the universe, it remains in itself a mystery and 

 insoluble. The unity of the intellect being, however, 

 beyond doubt, nothing could be less rational than to imagine 



