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that any intellectual modes of activity are specifically beyond 

 the laws of heredity. As scientists, we are only concerned 

 with the interpretation and recognition of facts, and with 

 experience, so that with regard to reason as to the nature 

 of which even metaphysicians are themselves by no means 

 agreed no possible theory can invalidate, or even oppose 

 our premises, for " the world of pure reason begins only 

 where the world of phenomena ends " and thus the scien- 

 tists and metaphysicians have each separate provinces. 

 Cousin and Reid define reason as "an impersonal, universal, 

 and necessary " faculty ; but can we not say as much of 

 heredity ? These characters being the same " everywhere, 

 always, and in all men," they are, therefore, specifically 

 characteristic, and such specific characteristics without 

 exception, it is the province of heredity to transmit; thus, 

 according to this definition of reason, " no faculty of man 

 is more certainly transmissible than the highest form of 

 intellect reason. For heredity, too, is impersonal, since 

 it preserves the species; and universal, since it governs 

 the whole domain of life ; and it is one of the forms of 

 inflexible necessity." If we, therefore, regard intellect and 

 reason from a transcendental point of view, they transcend 

 experience ; but if we consider them phenomenally, there 

 is no reason why they should be exempted from the law of 

 heredity. Our contention that the human intellect, even in 

 its highest forms, is hereditarily transmissible, in order to be 

 justified should be supported by numerous facts ; these 

 indeed are forthcoming in abundance, but for a detailed 

 list of instances of intellectual heredity among men of 

 science, philosophers, political economists, historians, critics, 

 novelists, etc., I can only refer the reader to the evidences 

 given in Ribot's splendid work. 



