XXXVI INTRODUCTION. 



a secondary spirit, co-extensive with the phy- 

 sical universe which she forms, and the limits 

 of which alone terminate her action? This 

 the various and wonderful operations attri- 

 buted to her by this her worshipper would 

 proclaim her to be. How then are we sur- 

 prised and astonished when studying and 

 weighing every scruple of his definitions of 

 this his great Diana of Ephesus, and casting 

 them up, we find at the foot of the account 

 that she literally amounts to NOTHING. That 

 she is a compound of attributes without any 

 subsistence to hang them upon. His primary 

 character of her, on which he insists in every 

 part of his works, declares her to be an Order 

 of Things. What idea does this phrase 

 convey to the mind ? That of things arranged 

 and acting in a certain order. But no this 

 is not his meaning. She is an order of things 

 composed of objects independent of matter. 

 These objects are all metaphysical, and are 

 neither beings, nor bodies, nor matter. But 

 if she is not a being, she can have no exist- 

 ence. Yes, says our author, she is composed 

 of motion. But what is motion considered 

 abstractedly, without reference to the mover 

 or the moved ? Like its negative rest, it is 



