SIXTH DAY'S SITTING. 140 



and that can. hold high and blessed fellowship with 

 God. 



If Mr. D-irwin made a mistake in carrying his hypothesis 

 into the domain of mind, he has made a yet greater 

 mistake in carrying it into that of conscience and the moral 

 sense, for, as he himself informs us, this sense is possible 

 only where there is human reason. " Any animal what- 

 ever," he says, "endowed with well-marked social instincts 

 would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience as 

 soon as its intellectual powers had become as well developed, 

 or nearly as well developed, as in man." But if an animal 

 must thus become an intellectual creature before it can 

 become a moral creature, Mr. Darwin must show that such 

 intellectual development is possible to it, before his argu- 

 ment can have the least weight. As we have just seen, 

 however, he not only fails to show that brute intellect is 

 essentially the same as human intellect, but indicates 

 various points of fundamental difference between them. 



I should be justified, therefore, in altogether declining to 

 notice what he says in this part of his subject, and would 

 certainly do so, were it not for the very serious error 

 involved in the views he puts forth, and the very serious 

 consequences that must result should those views find their 

 way into the popular mind. According to Mr. Darwin, con- 

 science is based on the social animal instincts, and is merely 

 the result of their fuller development in an animal in which 

 the mental faculties are being developed as well. But he 

 tells us further that he does " not wish to maintain that 

 every strictly social animal . . . would acquire exactly the 

 same moral sense as ours ;" that, " to take an extreme case, 

 if men were reared under precisely the same conditions as 

 hive-bees, there can hardly be a doubt that our unmarried 

 females would think it a sacred duty to kill their brothers, 



