DUAL CONSCIOUSNESS. 267 



forcibly exhibited the distinction between her two states of 

 consciousness. Rigid in morality during her usual con- 

 dition, she was shocked by the insults of a brutal neigh- 

 bour, who told her of a confession made to M. Azam during 

 her second condition, and accused her of shamming inno- 

 cence. The attack unfortunately, but too well founded as 

 far as facts were concerned brought on violent convulsions, 

 which required medical attendance during two or three 

 hours. It is important to notice the difference thus indicated 

 between the character of the personalities corresponding to 

 her two conditions. * Her moral faculties,' says M. Azam, 

 'were incontestably sound in her second life, though dif- 

 ferent,' by which, be it understood, he means simply that 

 her sense of right and wrong was just during her second 

 condition, not, of course, that her conduct was irreproachable. 

 She was in this condition, as in the other, altogether respon- 

 sible for her actions. But her power of self-control, or rather 

 perhaps the relative power of her will as compared with 

 tendencies to wrong-doing, was manifestly weaker during 

 her second condition. In fact, in one condition she was 

 oppressed and saddened by pain and anxiety, whereas in the 

 other she was almost free from pain, gay, light-hearted, and 

 hopeful. Now I cannot altogether agree with Mr. Slack's 

 remark, that if, during her second state, 'she had committed 

 a robbery or an assassination, no moral responsibility could 

 have been assumed to rest upon her with any certainty, by 

 any one acquainted with her history,' for her moral faculties 

 in her second condition being incontestably sound, she was 

 clearly responsible for her actions while in that condition. 

 But certainly, the question of punishment for such an offence 

 would be not a little complicated by her twofold personality. 

 To the woman in her ordinary condition, remembering 

 nothing of the crime committed (on the supposition we are 

 dealing with), in her abnormal condition, punishment for 

 that crime would certainly seem unjust, seeing that her 

 liability to enter into that condition had not in any degree 

 depended on her own will. The drunkard who, waking in 



