DUAL CONSCIOUSNESS. 269 



It does not appear to me that there is in the case of 

 FeHda X. any valid reason for regarding the theory of two 

 brains as the only available explanation. It is a noteworthy 

 circumstance, that the pains preceding each change of con- 

 dition affected both sides of the head. Some modification 

 of the circulation seems suggested as the true explanation of 

 the changes in condition, though the precise nature of such 

 modification, or how it may have been brought about, would 

 probably be very difficult to determine. The state of health, 

 however, on which the attacks depended seems to have 

 affected the whole body of the patient, and the case pre- 

 sents no features suggesting any lateral localisation of the 

 cerebral changes. 



On the other hand, the case of Sergeant F. (a few cf the 

 circumstances of which were mentioned in my essay entitled 

 ' Have we two Brains ? '), seems to correspond with Dr. 

 Holland's theory, though that theory is far from explaining 

 all the circumstances. The man was wounded by a bullet 

 which fractured his left parietal bone, and his right arm and 

 leg were almost immediately paralysed. When he recovered 

 consciousness three weeks later, the right side of the body 

 was completely paralysed, and remained so for a year. These 

 circumstances indicate that the cause of the mischief still 

 existing lay in the shock which the left side of the brain re- 

 ceived when the man was wounded. The right side may have 

 learned (as it were) to exercise the functions formerly belong- 

 ing to the left side, and thus the paralysis affecting the 

 right side until this had happened may have passed away. 

 These points are discussed in the essay above named, how- 

 ever, and need not here detain us. Others which were not 

 then dealt with may now be noted with advantage. We 

 would specially note some which render it doubtful whether 

 in the abnormal condition the man's brain acts at all, 

 whether in fact his condition, so far as consciousness was 

 concerned, is not similar to that of a frog deprived of its 



by which the other would not have suffered, and capital punishment 

 \nfiicted on one would have involved the death of the other. 



