28 Comparative Conceptions 



f ormance of the same functions have not been disturbed, the 

 same apparatus being so modified, however, as to serve the 

 two utihties in question more or less independently. 



Another case of interest from the psychological point of 

 view is that of the genetic interpretation of the function of 

 imitation, itself quasi-instinctive, or impulsive, in relation 

 to other mental and organic functions. As I have argued 

 in detail in Mental Development, considered genetically as 

 a type of reaction, imitation involves reference to an 

 end or ' copy,' which is the prime characteristic, also, 

 of intelligent action ; but it is held down to a definite 

 psychophysical process, called the 'circular' process, 

 whereby the copy is reinstated by the act of imitation. 

 For example, my parrot has just learned to say ' Hulloa ' 

 imitatively. He learns to pronounce this word just as an 

 intelligent child would learn to do it ; but he cannot vary, 

 modify, or inhibit it, nor exercise selection in the mianner 

 of his doing it. His act seems to lie, therefore, as type of 

 function, midway between the congenital instinct and intel- 

 ligent selective action. The present writer considered this 

 function to be probably a case in which natural selection 

 has put a premium upon the acquisition of adjustments 

 which would keep a creature alive and give the species 

 time to acquire the congenital mechanism for performing 

 the same functions — illustrating what is called, below, 

 'organic selection.' Imitation would, thus considered, in 

 many cases aid the development of instincts ; in all cases, 

 that is, in which the instinctive performance would, by 

 reason of promptness, accuracy, etc., be of greater or of 

 additional utihty. But about the same time Professor 

 Groos pubUshed his theory of play in a work in which 

 imitation is held to have just the opposite genetic relation 



