'](i Heredity and Instinct 



utility even when the intelligence may perform the same 

 actions in its own fashion. So it remains in each case to 

 find out this utility and appraise it, before we say that it 

 is not a reason for survival. It would seem that reflexes 

 are of supreme importance and value ; and if so, then 

 natural selection may be appealed to, to account for 

 them. So about all that remains of this argument of 

 Romanes is the contribution which it makes to the refuta- 

 tion of his other one — from co-adaptations. The assump- 

 tion of intelligence disposes of both the arguments, for 

 the intelligence supplements slight co-adaptations and so 

 makes them effective and useful ; but it does not keep 

 them from serving other utilities, as instincts, reflexes, 

 etc., by further variation. 



§ 2. Reflexes and Imitation 



II. There is still another very interesting question also 

 to be settled by fact. Romanes and others cite simple 

 reflexes as well as complex instincts as giving illustrations 

 of the application of the principle of ' inherited habit ' or 

 'lapsed intelligence'; and the cases which Romanes lays 

 great stress on are the reflex actions of man's withdrawal 

 of the leg from irritation to the soles, and the brainless 

 frog's balancing himself.^ The Neo-Lamarckian theory 

 requires the assumption of intelligence for all of these. 

 I have shown that granting the intelligence, that is just 

 the assumption which in many cases enables us to discard 

 the Lamarckian factor. But we may ask : Is the intelli- 

 gence necessary for all reflexes } 



The question is too involved for treatment here; but 



1 Passage cited above from Romanes. 



