Reflexes and Imitation *]"] 



the assumption that intelligence is necessary in any sense 

 which makes the conscious voluntary performance of the 

 action always precede the reflex performance in evolution 

 is difficult to defend. For all that we know of the brain 

 seat of voluntary intelligence, of the use of means to ends, 

 etc., indicates that such action is dependent upon the pres- 

 ence of the great mass of organic reflex processes which go 

 on below the cortex. Complex associative processes must 

 be genetically (and phylogenetically) later than the simple 

 reflex processes, which, as has been intimated above, they 

 presuppose. 



But the more liberal definition of intelligence, which 

 makes it include all kinds of conscious processes — the 

 assumption of intelligence being that simply of con- 

 scious process of some kind — that is a different matter. 

 This supposition seems to be necessary on either theory 

 of instinct, as is argued above ; for if we do not assume it, 

 then natural selection is inadequate, as say Romanes and 

 Cope ; but if we do assume it, then the inheritance of 

 acquired characters is unnecessary. On this simpler defi- 

 nition of intelligence, however, we find certain states 

 of consciousness, of which imitation is the most promi- 

 nent example, serving nature a turn in the matter of 

 evolution. 



On this wider definition of intelligence the difference 

 between intelligent {e.g., imitative) action and instinctive 

 reflex action is much greater than that pointed out in 

 detail above between voluntary and reflex action. A word 

 to show this may be allowed here, since it makes yet 

 stronger the case against the special argument from selec- 

 tive fitness, which this paper set out to examine. 



The differences between imitative action and reflex or 



