"j^ Heredity a7id Ins Unci 



instinctive action are not just those which we have found 

 between voluntary and reflex actions. Imitation seems to 

 be a native impulse ; and in so far it seems to be, like the 

 instincts, stimulated from the periphery. But it has a 

 further point of differentiation from the special instincts 

 and reflexes in that it is what has been called a ' circular ' 

 reaction, i.e., it tends to reproduce its stimulus again, — 

 the movement seen, the sound heard, etc. There is always 

 a certain comparability or similarity, in a case of conscious 

 imitation, between the thing imitated and the imitator's 

 result ; and the imitation is unmistakably real in propor- 

 tion as this similarity is real. We may say, therefore, that 

 consciously imitative actions are confined to those certain 

 channels of discharge with produce results comparable with 

 the 'copy' which is imitated. 



But the special instincts and reflexes are not so. They 

 show the greatest variety of arrangement between the 

 stimulus and the movement which results from it — arrange- 

 ments which have grown up under the law of survival. They 

 represent, therefore, special utilities which direct conscious 

 imitation in each case, by the individual creature, does 

 not secure ; while conscious imitation represents a general 

 utility more akin to that which we have found in volun- 

 tary intelligence. 



If this be so, then we have to say that conscious imita- 

 tion, while it prevents the incidence of natural selection, as 

 has been seen, and so keeps alive the creatures which have 

 no instincts for the performance of the actions required, 

 nevertheless does not subserve the utilities which the 

 special instincts do, nor prevent them from having the 

 survival value of which Romanes speaks. Accordingly, 

 on the more general definition of intelligence, which 



