Lamar ckism and Teleology 231 



§ 4. Lamarckism and Teleology 



The philosophical defence of the Lamarckian principle 

 is usually made from the point of view of teleology, that 

 is, that of a determinate movement in evolution, which is, 

 in some form, the realization of a purpose or end. It is 

 thought that through the accommodations secured by indi- 

 vidual animals — provided they be inherited — a determinate 

 direction of evolution toward such a realization is secured ; 

 while, on the other hand, the principle of natural selection, 

 working upon ' fortuitous ' variations, is called * blind ' 

 and mechanical (cf. the discussion of Ward, Naturalism 

 and Agnosticism, Vol. I. Chap. 10). 



There seem to the present writer to be certain confu- 

 sions lurking in such a view. In the first place, it confuses 

 teleology in the process of evolution with purpose in the 

 individual mind. There are two errors here: (i) it is not 

 seen that the evolution process might realize an end or 

 ideal without aid from the individual's efforts or conscious 

 purposes. Indeed, even on the Lamarckian principle, most 

 of the inherited modifications would not be directly due 

 to the individual's purpose or conscious effort, but to semi- 

 mechanical and organic accommodations, and the purpose 

 of the whole could be only partially interpreted in terms 

 of the teleological processes of the individual mind. But 

 those who maintain a general teleological view in cosmology 

 must hold that the cosmic evolution as a whole, and not 

 merely the genesis of certain functions consciously and 

 purposively acquired by the individual, is in some sense 

 purposive. (2) It is not seen that the reverse is also true, 

 i.e., that in spite of purpose in the individual mind, 

 together with the inheritance of acquired modifications in 



