2 54 Selective Thinking 



however vaguely, into the complex of earlier knowledge, 

 in order that the habitual motor reflex, which attention is, 

 may be exercised upon them. 



In considering in the book cited the empirical complex 

 mental contents which constitute attention,^ I found it 

 necessary to distinguish three sets of motor events ; and 

 I threw them into a certain 'attention formula,' as fol- 

 lows : Att. (attention) = A-\-a-\-a\ the yi representing the 

 gross and relatively constant reflex elements which give 

 attention its main sensational character; the a represent- 

 ing the special elements which vary with different classes 

 of experiences, as for example with the different sense- 

 qualities ; and the a representing the refined variations 

 which attention to particular objects as such brings out. 

 It is a part of the general analysis of attention which 

 issues in this formula that the state of mind called 'rec- 

 ognition ' varies as some or other of these elements of 

 attention are present without variation through repeated 

 experiences. All are present v/ithout variation when we 

 recognize a particular object as familiar ; there is variation 

 in the a elements only when we are able to place a new 

 object in a familiar class but yet do not find ourselves 

 familiar with it for itself ; there are variations in both the 

 a and the a elements when a novel experience simply 

 meets the general requirements of our grosser life of 

 habit, but yet has no place in the organization of our 

 knowledge.^ 



1 Mental Development in the Child and the Race, Chap. X. § 3, and Chap. 

 XL § 2.' 



2 Thus the animal instincts show gross motor reactions upon the objects 

 which call them out, and it may be that the only differentiation of the objects 

 possible to the creature is just that suppUed by his differentiated instinctive 

 attitudes including the attention. 



