284 The Origin of a ^ Thing'' and its Nature 



which are held to be only a putting in evidence of the rela- 

 tions already existing in nature. If consciousness is no 

 new thing — on our behaviour definition of thing — then 

 knowledge of the historical movement of reality must be 

 not at all different from the movement which has led up to 

 the knowledge. The discovery of the principle of evolution, 

 for example, is not a new event added to the fact that the 

 series evolving was there to be discovered ! 



But we may be even more concrete. The writer has 

 developed a view of mental development which not only 

 makes each stage of it a matter of legitimate natural his- 

 tory, but goes on to say that the one process of motor 

 adjustment is imitative in type. What could be a more in- 

 viting field for the criticism : imitation is mere repetition. 

 How can anything new come out of imitation } Not only 

 is consciousness merely repeating the relationships already 

 present in nature, but the development of consciousness itself 

 is merely a series of repetitions of its own acts. This 

 criticism has already been made, especially with reference 

 to volition. How, it is asked, can anything new be willed 

 if volition is in its origin only imitation become complex t 



The reply serves to make concrete what has been said 

 immediately above. The counter question may be put : 

 why cannot anything new come out of imitations .? Why 

 may not the very repetition be the new thing, or the con- 

 dition of it } To deny it is to say that by looking at the 

 former instance, the historical, after its occurrence, you can 

 say that that occurrence fully expressed mental behaviour. 

 On the contrary, the prospective reference gained by the 

 imitation may bring out something new ; the repetition 

 may be just what is needed to develop an important stage 

 in the career of mental reality. In itself, indeed, an imi- 



