384 Appendix C 



biological and instinctive, and also psychological and intelligent, 

 as sympathy, fear, bashfulness. Then, of course, the further 

 question comes up as to which of these forms is primary, again 

 the old question as to whether intelligence arose out of reflexes 

 or the reverse. 



I think some light falls on this time-honoured question from the 

 statement of it in connection with this new question of play, and 

 especially when we remember Herr Groos' theory of the function 

 of imitation and the extension of his view suggested above. If 

 imitation stands midway between instinct and intelligence, both 

 furthering the growth of instinct, and also leading to its decay 

 in the presence of intelligence, then we might hold something 

 like this : In proportion as an action loses its consciously imita- 

 tive and volitional character, to that degree it loses its Schei?i 

 character, and becomes real in consciousness and instinctive in 

 performance (and this applies to the cases in which imitation 

 has itself become habitual and instinctive) ; and on the contrary, 

 in proportion as an instinctive action is modified and adapted 

 through imitation and intelligence, to that degree it becomes 

 capable of assuming the Schehi character and is indulged in as 

 conscious play. I cannot enlarge upon this here, but it seems 

 to square with a good many of the facts, both those which Groos 

 cites as showing that imitation opens the way for the decay of 

 instinct with the growi;h of intelligence, and those which Morgan 

 and I have cited as showing that imitation keeps congenital 

 variations alive and so allows them to accumulate into instincts. 

 And I think it so far confirms the view that imitation is a sort of 

 meeting-point of race habit, represented by instinct, and race 

 accommodation, represented by intelligence — just the double 

 function which imitation serves also in the development of the 

 individual (cf. my volume on Mental Development, in /oc). 



Going into the analysis of the play psychosis, Herr Groos 

 finds several sources of pleasure to the animal in it (pp. 203 ff.) 

 — pleasure of satisfying an instinct, pleasure of movement and 

 energetic action, but, most of all, 'pleasure in being a cause.' 

 This last, together with the ' pleasure in experimenting,' which 

 characterizes many play activities, is urged with great insistence. 



