386 ' Appendix C 



both with the necessity of sense and with the imperative of 

 thought and conscience. This idea seems to be part of Schiller's 

 theory of play. So Groos thinks the general feeling of freedom 

 holds in consciousness only while there is a play of motives to 

 which the agent may put an end at any moment — a sense of 

 * don't-have-to ' in the life of choice. This sense of freedom 

 keeps the Schein consciousness pure and prevents our confusing 

 the play content with the possible real contents of life. This is 

 very interesting and suggestive. The sense of freedom is cer- 

 tainly prominent in play. Whether it should be identified with 

 the sense of control which has been used by some writers as a 

 criterion (both in a negative and in a positive sense) of the belief 

 in realities already experienced, or again with the freedom with 

 which choice is pregnant, is more questionable. Without caring 

 to make a criticism of Professor Groos' position, I may yet point 

 out the distinction already made above between the two sorts of 

 imagination, one of which has the ' don't-have-to ' feeling and 

 the other of which does not. So also in our choices there are 

 those which are free with a ' don't-have-to ' freedom, but there 

 are choices — and these are the momentous ones, the ones to 

 which freedom that men value attaches — which are streni^us 

 and real in the extreme. Indeed, it seems paradoxical to liken 

 the moral life, with its sense of freedom, to a- ' game of play,' 

 and to allow the hard-pressed sailor on the ethical sea to rest on 

 his oars behind a screen of Schein and plead, ' I shan't play.' 

 Seriously, this is something like the result, and it comes out 

 again in the author's extremely interesting sections on art, of 

 which I may speak in conclusion.^ 



Those who have read Professor Groos' former stimulating 

 book, Einleitimg in die ^sthetik, will anticipate the connection 

 which he finds between play and art.^ The art consciousness is 



1 In the later volume, The Play of Man, Professor Groos so modifies his 

 definition of play as to make the only criterion what I have called its ' auto- 

 telic' character, as having its own end {Selbstzweck), being performed simply 

 for itself with no further end. 



2 The reader may now consult another later publication by Professor 

 Groos, Der cesthetische Genuss (1902). 



