PART II. 



GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF LEIBNIZ. 



Statement of Leibniz's Problem : How can that which is 

 continuous consist of indivisible Elements ? 



IN the preface to his The'odice'e 1 Leibniz declares that 

 * there are two famous labyrinths, in which our reason 

 often goes astray : the one relates to the great question 

 of liberty and necessity, especially in regard to the 

 production and origin of evil ; the other consists in the 

 discussion of continuity and of the indivisible points which 

 appear to be its elements, and this question involves the 

 consideration of the infinite. The former of these perplexes 

 almost all the human race, the latter claims the attention 

 of philosophers alone/ Accordingly, while a right under- 

 standing of the principle of continuity is of the utmost 

 speculative importance, the practical value of a true 

 knowledge of necessity is equally great. Thus, Leibniz 

 makes his Theodicee an investigation of the meaning of 

 liberty and necessity, while in others of his writings he 

 oifers a solution of the problem which he describes as the 

 special perplexity of philosophers. 



It is this latter problem with which we are here mainly 

 concerned. The philosophical work of Leibniz was an 

 endeavour to reconcile the notion of substance as con- 

 tinuous with the contrary notion of substance as consisting 

 of indivisible elements. The opposition of these two notions 

 1 E. 470 a ; G. vi. 29. 



