GENEKAL PKINCIPLES 31 



continuity through infinite degrees of intension. The 

 word 'intension,' however, does not help us much. It 

 must be more precisely defined. 



The antinomy between whole and parts, which was 

 the issue of the quantitative or extensive view of sub- 

 stance, had its roots in the conception of whole and parts 

 as inevitably exclusive of one another, the whole being 

 regarded as prior to the parts or the parts as prior to the 

 whole. That is to say, either, as in the view of Spinoza, 

 the parts are to be deduced, in a purely analytic way, 

 from the whole as self-evidently given, or, as in the 

 Atomist doctrine, the whole is a secondary construction, 

 of a purely synthetic kind, from the primary parts. In 

 contrast with this the intensive doctrine of substance 

 which regards determination as primary or essential 

 amounts to a declaration that whole and part are in- 

 separable. All specific determinations, states, or func- 

 tions are determinations, states, or functions of the whole, 

 not in the sense that they are ultimately reducible to one 

 vague determination which is common to everything, but 

 in the sense that the whole is expressed, symbolized, and 

 therefore in some way included in each, however specific, 

 individual, limited it may be. Thus the parts are not 

 determined or characterized without reference to the 

 whole, and the whole is not a mere vague aggregate of 

 independent parts. In some sense each part must con- 

 tain the whole within itself, each unit must include an 

 infinite manifold. The whole stands not merely in a 

 mechanical, but in a dynamic relation to the part. The 

 whole is not merely other than the part, but in some 

 way passes into it and expresses itself through it. That, 

 in general, is the conception of substance as essentially 

 intensive rather than extensive. 



There is here an approach to the modern conception of 

 organism as more adequate to the expression of substance 

 than are merely mechanical conceptions \ But the special 



1 Leibniz does hold that all real substances are organic (cf. p. 108). 



