GENERAL PRINCIPLES 33 



contained, but rather as a relation of symbolized and 

 symbols, sign and thing signified. That is to say, the 

 part must be a representation of the whole from some 

 particular point of view, a symbol or expression of the 

 whole, and the part must .contain the whole in such 

 a way that the whole might be unfolded entirely from 

 within it \ 



Thus the part must have a certain spontaneity or power 

 of acting from within itself, and in virtue of this Leibniz 

 describes the individual substance as essentially a * force* 

 rather than a quantity. This intensive essence or force 

 in the part (or individual substance) .appears in two ways. 

 As representative or symbolic of the whole, the part, in 

 Leibniz's terminology, has 'Perception,' while, in so far 

 as in the part the potential whole tends to realize itself, 

 the part is said -to have ' Appetition.' Both of these 

 characteristics must belong to it, for, if it had perception 

 alone, the part would merely represent one aspect of the 

 whole, like an unchanging picture. It is in virtue of its 

 appetiti6n that the part is able to realize the life of the 

 whole, to unfold spontaneously from within itself all the 

 variations of that which it represents 2 . 



This new atom or unit of substance (the 'simple 

 substance' in his own phrase) Leibniz calls ,a Monad 3 . 



1 Although, as a matter of fact, it never is so unfolded. Prae- 

 dicatum inest subjecto ; but, in the case. of any actual thing, to develop 

 the predicate out of the subject would involve an infinite analysis. 

 We here touch a fundamental inconsistency in Leibniz's thought. 



2 Cf. De Anima Brutorum, 12 (E. 464 b ; G. vii. 330) : ' Not only is 

 the variety of the object represented in that which has perception ; 

 but there is also variation in the representation itself, since that 

 which is to be represented varies.' 



3 Cf. Epistola ad R. C. Wagnerum (1.710) (E. 466 a ; G. vii. 529) : 

 '. . . Monads, and, so to speak, metaphysical atoms, without parts.' 

 Also Replique aux Reflexions de Bayle (1702) (E. 186 b ; G. iv. 561) : 

 'In fact, I regard souls, or rather Monads, as atoms of substance, 

 since, in my opinion, there are no atoms of matter in nature and the 

 smallest portion of matter has still parts.' See also New System, 

 3 and n. Leibniz says that he applies the term ' Monad' to the 

 simple substance, because it is unum per se. De ipsa natura (1698) 

 (E. 158 a ; G. iv. 511). But * Monads are not to be confounded with 

 atoms. Atoms (as people imagine them) have shapes; Monads no 



