44 INTRODUCTION 



never mentions Geulincx in his writings, must have been 

 quite unaware of Geulincx's use of the illustration. And 

 in any case there is this essential difference between the 

 Occasionalist theory and that of pre-established harmony, 

 that the former regards finite things as empty of all 

 activity except that which is immediately communicated 

 to them by God, while the latter is founded on the 

 conception of finite things as in reality forces, Monads 

 with spontaneous activity '. Thus, the Occasionalist 

 theory is open to the criticism which Leibniz repeatedly 

 // brings against it, namely, that it involves the supposition 

 of perpetual miracle, or, in other words, that, if it be true, 

 the connexion between soul and body must be a purely 

 arbitrary one, there being nothing in the nature of either 

 which can serve as a reason why this phenomenon of soul 

 should accompany that phenomenon of body and not some 

 other. The Monads, on the other hand, have at least this 

 in common, that it is of the essence of each to represent 

 the same world from a particular point of view, and that 

 each unfolds the series of its perceptions or representa- 

 tions in an intelligible order. The whole is potentially 

 present and seeks its realization in each of the parts. 

 Consequently, the pre-established harmony is not arbi- 

 trary, but rational : no Deus ex machina is invoked. Thus 

 it is impossible to regard Leibniz's theory as the com- 

 pletion of the Occasionalist doctrine, unless in the sense 



1 'When I speak of the force and action of created beings, I mean 

 that each created being is pregnant with its future state, and that 

 it naturally follows a certain course, if nothing hinders it ; and 

 that the Monads, which are the true and only substances, cannot 

 be naturally hindered in their inner determinations, since they 

 include the representation of everything external [to them]. But, 

 nevertheless, I do not say that the future state of the created being 

 follows from its present state without the co-operation [concours] of 

 God, and I am rather of opinion that preservation is a continual 

 creation with an orderly change. Thus Father Malebranche might 

 perhaps approve the pre-established harmony without giving up 

 his own hypothesis, to the effect that God is the sole Agent [acteur] ; 

 though it is true that otherwise it [his hypothesis] does not appear 

 to me well founded.' Lettre a Bourguet ^1714) (E. 722 a ; G. iii. 566). 



