GENERAL PRINCIPLES 49 



tinction betweeja distinct and confused ideas to the ideas 

 which we consciously possess, nor does he draw a sharp 

 line between ideas which are perfectly clear and distinct, 

 and all others, which are confused or obscure. Confused 

 perceptions are not for Leibniz, as for Descartes, mere 

 mistakes and illusions ; but they belong to the real order 

 of things, which without them could not be what it is. 

 And there is no question, as in Descartes, regarding the 

 correspondence of perceptions to reality, clear and distinct 

 ideas representing their objects with perfect truth, while 

 obscure and confused ideas are ' of no avail in affording 

 us the knowledge of anything out of ourselves, but serve 

 rather to impede it l . ' According to Leibniz all perceptions 

 are more or less perfect representations of objects ; but 

 they vary infinitely in their degrees of distinctness or 

 confusedness. Confusedness is simply a low degree of 

 distinctness : the more perfect any perception or repre- 

 sentation is, the more distinct is it, while the less perfect it 

 is, the more is it confused. Thus the differences among the 

 Monads consist entirely in the various degrees of perfec- 

 tion or distinctness with which they perceive or represent 



(E. 79 a ; Q-. iv. 422) : ( A notion is obscure when it does not suffice 

 for the recognition of the thing represented, as for instance when 

 I remember some flower or animal formerly seen, but not so well 

 as to be able to recognize it when it appears and to distinguish it 

 from some other near it, or when I think of some scholastic term 

 insufficiently explained, like the "entelechy" of Aristotle, or 

 " cause" in so far as the name is applied indifferently to material, 

 formal, efficient, and final causes. . . . Thus knowledge is clear 

 when it enables us to recognize the thing represented, and clear 

 knowledge again is either confused or distinct. It is confused 

 when I cannot separately enumerate the marks which are sufficient 

 for distinguishing the thing from others, although the thing really 

 has such marks and essential elements, into which its notion may 

 be analyzed. . . . So we see painters and other artists knowing 

 rightly what is well and what is badly done, but often unable to 

 give a reason for their opinion and saying that the thing they 

 dislike is lacking in something, they know not what. ' But a distinct 

 notion is such an one as the assayers have regarding gold, namely 

 one acquired through marks and tests sufficient for the discerning 

 of the thing from all other similar bodies.' For Locke's views, cf. 

 Essay, bk. ii. ch. 29, i sqq. (Fraser's ed., vol. i. p. 486). 

 1 Principia, Part iv. 203. 



