GENERAL PRINCIPLES 51 



and, so to speak, incorporeal automata V That is to say, 

 each is, in its own way, complete in itself as representing 

 the universe and complete in itself as an active living 

 being or force. On the other hand, every Monad might 

 be called a 'soul,' inasmuch as it has both perception 

 and appetition, in the general sense of these words 

 which has been already explained. Nevertheless, in spite 

 of this essential unity of nature in the Monads, it is 

 possible to draw broad lines of division among them. 

 Conscious sensation or feeling, accompanied by the 

 simpler forms of memory, clearly marks off certain 

 Monads from those which have merely unconscious or 

 confused perception. To the former class the name 

 ' souls ' may be specially applied, while for the latter the 

 general name of Entelechies or Monads will suffice. And 

 as there are still higher Monads which have self-conscious- 

 ness and reason or thought proper, in addition to uncon- 

 scious and conscious perception and memory, we may 

 call these ' rational souls ' or ' spirits ' (intelligences, 

 esprits) 2 . The class of rational souls or spirits includes 

 men and higher intelligences. The intermediate i soul '- 

 class is that of animals, and the class of Entelechies or 

 bare Monads includes all real beings that have not 

 reached the stage of consciousness. 



The differences of appetition in the three classes of 

 created Monads (corresponding to the three grades of 

 perception which characterize them) may be expressed 

 as mere impulse, animal instinct or blind desire governed 

 by mere feeling, and self-conscious desire or will. 



Each of the two higher classes possesses, in addition 

 to its own specific qualities, the characteristics of the 



1 Monadology, 18. 



2 Cf. De Anima Brutorum (1710), 10 and 13 (E. 464 b; G. vii. 

 330) : ' Sense is perception which contains something distinct and 

 is combined with attention and memory. . . . Besides the lowest 

 degree of perception, which also occurs in those who are stunned, 

 and the intermediate degree, which we call sense . . . there is a 

 certain higher degree which we call thought. Now thought is 

 perception combined with reason.' 



E 2 



