GENERAL PRINCIPLES 53 



self-consciousness alone that we have immediate self- 

 certainty, from which we may proceed outward to the 

 certainty of other things. Thus for Descartes the line 

 between consciousness and unconsciousness on the one 

 side and self-consciousness on the other must be very 

 sharply drawn : the complete independence of self-con- 

 sciousness is the root of the Cartesian dualism. 



Now 7 Leibniz desires to preserve the independence of 

 self-consciousness or the self-certainty and self-sufficiency 

 of the mind. The validity of thinking must not be made 

 to depend on reference to a reality external to it \ But, 

 on the other hand, the mechanical dualism of Descartes 

 must be avoided. The independence of self-consciousness 

 is preserved through the conception of the Monads as 

 a plurality of real, independent substances. Mind is not 

 merely a modification of substance, an attribute (as 

 Spinoza made it) ; it is an independent substance, in 

 its various forms one or other of the infinite number. 

 But, on the other hand, mind must not be regarded as 

 identical with self-consciousness alone : self-consciousness 

 must not be taken as entirely exclusive of mere con- 

 sciousness or of unconsciousness. Otherwise we have 

 returned to the Cartesian dualism. There must some- 

 how be an unconscious activity of mind, and the oppo- 

 sition between mind and body becomes a difference, not 

 of kind but of degree. 



1 Cf. Remarques sur le sentiment du P. Malebranche (1708) (E. 452 b ; 

 G. vi. 578) : ' The truth is that we see all things in ourselves and 

 in our souls, and that the knowledge we have of the soul is very 

 real and correct, provided we have given some attention to it. 

 And further, it is through the knowledge which we have of the 

 soul that we know being, substance, God Himself, and it is 

 through reflexion upon our thoughts that we know extension and 

 bodies. Yet it is true that God gives us all that is positive in this, 

 and all the perfection involved in it, through an immediate and / 

 continual emanation, in virtue of the dependence of all created f 

 beings upon Him. In this way it is possible to give a good 

 meaning to the phrase that God is the object of our souls and that 

 we see all things in Him.' Cf. also Part iii. of this Introduction, 

 p. 136. 



