GENERAL PRINCIPLES 7! 



whole is what Leibniz means by the character of the 

 Monad as at once exclusively individual and represen- 

 tative or perceptive of the whole universe from its par- 

 ticular point of view. 



Again, the appetition of the Monads is due entirely 

 to the principle of sufficient reason. A substance which 

 is real in virtue of its mere possibility can have no ten- 

 dency to a change of state 1 . If it were really to change 

 it would cease to be itself. But the appetition of the 

 Monads is ruled not by the principle of realizing the self- 

 consistent or the abstractly possible, but by the principle 

 of realizing the best or the full harmony of a system. 

 The pre-established harmony of the universe as a 

 system of l compossible ' substances is the ground or 

 reason of the appetition in each, the principle of its 

 changes. But this, as we have seen, is a consequence 

 of admitting the principle of sufficient reason. 



Lastly, a very slight consideration will show that the 

 law of continuity (with its obverse, the identity of in- 

 discernibles) is a particular application of the principle 

 of sufficient reason. A breach in the continuity of the 

 series of simple substances would mean a void in nature. 

 Such a void is not inconsistent with the principle of 

 contradiction : it is not self-evidently impossible. But 

 it is inconsistent with the principle of the best or most 

 fitting which governs the actual system of things, that 

 is to say, it is inconsistent with the principle of sufficient 

 reason. That one possible thing is in itself more perfect 

 than another is no sufficient reason for the existence of 

 the former rather than the latter ; the former might 

 perhaps be incompatible, while the latter is compatible, 

 with the rest of the world. But it is inconsistent 



1 Cf. Spinoza's Conatus, the ' effort by which each thing endeavours 

 to persevere in its own being,' and which is ' nothing but the actual 

 essence of the thing itself.' Ethics, Part iii. Prop. 7. Leibniz 

 might say that, on Spinoza's principles, to call this an * effort ' is to 

 beg the question, because effort implies tendency towards some- 

 thing. 



