STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ'S PHILOSOPHY 85 



and apparently disconnected ideas which make up our 

 knowledge could be analyzed into their simple elements, 

 and if these elements could each be represented by a 

 definite sign, we should have a kind of 'alphabet of 

 human thoughts.' By the combination of these signs 

 (letters of the alphabet of thought) a system of true 

 knowledge would be built up, in which reality would be 

 more and more adequately represented or symbolized. 

 For, according to Leibniz, the progress of knowledge con- 

 sists in passing from obscure to clear ideas, from clear to 

 distinct, from distinct to adequate. Ideas are obscure when 

 analysis has not proceeded so far as to enable us definitely 

 to distinguish them from others. They are clear when 

 we can so distinguish them, but are not yet able to 

 enumerate their particular elements or qualities. They are 

 distinct when we can enumerate their qualities, and they 

 are adequate only when the analysis is complete, that is 

 to say, when all the elements of the clear and distinct 

 idea are themselves clear and distinct. In many cases 

 the analysis may result in an infinite series of elements ; 

 but the principles of the Infinitesimal Calculus in mathe- 

 matics have shown that this does not necessarily render 

 calculation impossible or inaccurate l . Thus it seemed to 

 Leibniz that a synthetic calculus, based upon a thorough 

 analysis, would be the most effective instrument of 

 knowledge that could be devised. ' I feel,' he says, ' that 

 controversies can never be finished, nor silence imposed 

 upon the Sects, unless we give up complicated reasonings 

 in favour of simple calculations, words of vague and un- 

 certain meaning in favour of fixed symbols [characteres]' 2 .' 

 Thus it will appear that * every paralogism is nothing but 

 an error of calculation.' 'When controversies arise, there 

 will be no more necessity for disputation between two 

 philosophers than between two accountants. Nothing 

 will be needed but that they should take pen in hand, sit 



1 Cf. this Introduction, Part ii. p. 61 note. 



2 De Scientia Universali sen Calculo Phihsophico (E. 83 b ; G. vii. 200). 



