STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ S PHILOSOPHY 95 



place : but it cannot be a body unless it has a place of its 

 own. And its avriTviria consists in its .maintaining its 

 place, staying where it is. Kesistance is thus a passive 

 force. ' Matter taken by itself or bare matter consists of 

 avTiTwrrta and extension. By avriTwria I mean that attribute 

 in virtue of which matter is in space. Extension is con- 

 tinuation through space, or continuous diffusion through- 

 out a place \ ' Matter is that which consists in di/TiTwria 

 or which resists penetration ; and thus bare matter is 

 merely passive 2 . ' In so far, then, as a material body is 

 extended and occupies a place which cannot be occupied 

 by any other body at the same time (for this is the 

 meaning of avrirviria or impenetrability), it consists of 

 bare matter. Bare or abstract matter, as thus denned 

 a + extension), Leibniz usually calls materia prima. 



(2) Materia secunda. 



But we must beware of supposing that this materia 

 prima is by itself anything actual. As the mathematical 

 point is nothing actual, but is the indivisible limit of 

 extension, so materia prima is the indivisible limit of 

 matter. No portion of matter, no material body, consists 

 of materia prima alone, just as no portion of extension 

 is a mere mathematical point. For materia prima is 

 simply body considered as if it were purely passive : it is 

 the abstract passivity of body. But, as we have seen, 

 there is, according to Leibniz, no such thing as absolute 

 passivity. Passive resistance, impenetrability, inertia, 

 always involve a real force, a tendency to action, though 

 that tendency may actually be prevented by counteracting 

 forces from realizing itself at this or that particular 

 moment. Passivity is the limit of activity, as rest is the 

 limit of motion. Every material body, then, is ultimately 

 something more than avriTinria + extension. It is essen- 

 tially force or energy, activity of some kind. And 



1 De Anima Brutorum (1710), i (E. 462 a ; G. vii. 328). 



2 Epistola ad Bierlingium (1710) (E. 678 a ; G. vii. 501). 



