104 INTRODUCTION 



order remaining the same, one of the two states, namely, 

 that of a supposed anticipation, would not at all differ, 

 nor could be discerned from the other which now is V 



Accordingly, Leibniz's theory of space and time may 

 be summarized thus. Phenomena are bem fiwdata in 

 proportion as they are connected together. Space and 

 time are orders or systems of connexion between pheno- 

 mena, the bond being co-existence in the one case, 

 succession in the other. Apart from the phenomena, 

 space and time are mere abstractions. Thus pure space 

 and pure time are at two removes from reality, for 

 the things which are in space and time are not Monads 

 but phenomena. Yet ultimately phenomena are imperfect 

 realities, unanalyzed perceptions. They have a basis in 

 simple substance. Thus there must be something non- 

 spatial and non-temporal, of which space and time are 

 the imperfect expressions. And in a letter to Schulenburg 

 (1698) Leibniz, after denning space and time in his usual 

 way, says that * in themselves \per se] they have no reality 

 beyond the Divine Immensity and Eternity V 



1 lll me Lettre a Clarke, 5, 6 (Clarke's tr.) (E. 752 a ; G. vii. 364^). 

 In answer to this, Clarke, while professedly admitting the prin- 

 ciple of sufficient reason, really denies its validity by maintaining 

 that the mere will of God is to be counted as a sufficient reason, 

 and that therefore Leibniz's application of the principle does not 

 prove his case. Cf. lV me Lettre a Clarke, 18 (E. 756 b ; G. vii. 374) : 

 'Space being uniform, there can be neither any external nor 

 internal reason by which to distinguish its parts and to make 

 any choice among them. For any external reason to discern 

 between them can only be grounded upon some internal one. 

 Otherwise we should discern what is indiscernible, or choose 

 without discerning. A will without reason would be the ' chance ' 

 of the Epicureans. A God, who should act by such a will, would 

 be a God only in name.' 



With regard to the general question, cf. V me Lettre a Clarke, 62 (E. 

 771 b ; G. vii. 406) : <I don't say that matter and space are the 

 same thing. I only say, there is no space where there is no 

 matter, and that space in itself is not an absolute reality. Space 

 and matter differ as time and motion. However these things, 

 though different, are inseparable.' 



2 G. Math. vii. 242. For Leibniz's account of the origin of 

 our idea of space, see Appendix B. p. 202. 



