STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ S PHILOSOPHY 109 



perception. The world consists solely of Monads, each 

 of which is a concrete unity of soul and body, of entelechy 

 and materia prima. Thus nature is throughout living ; 

 there is nothing really inorganic \ What, then, is meant 

 by the common distinction between organic or living and 

 inorganic or material bodies? In order to answer this 

 question, we must consider more fully the nature of 

 compound substance. 



While the simple substances alone are real they appear 

 as phenomena in groups or aggregates, which we call 

 compound substances. Indeed, although in reality they 

 are secondary, compound substances are prior to simple 

 substances in the order of knowledge. As phenomena 

 they can be perceived by the senses, while the Monad* 

 cannot be so perceived. For the Monads are not really 

 grouped or combined ; the aggregation is purely pheno- 

 menal. Now each Monad implied in any such aggregate 

 perceives or represents all the phenomena constituting its 

 group, since it perceives the whole universe, of which they 

 are parts. But as each Monad diifers from all the others 

 in the degree of distinctness of its perceptions there must 

 in each group be one Monad which represents the group 

 more distinctly than does any other Monad implied in it. 

 This Monad of most distinct perception in each compound 

 substance Leibniz calls the dominant Monad of the 

 substance 2 . It has a formal superiority over the others 



maticians to investigate the difficulties de compositione continm when 

 they are working at the solution of some problem. These things 

 are none the less important and worthy of consideration in their 

 own place. All the phenomena of bodies can be explained 

 mechanically or by the corpuscular philosophy, according to certain 

 principles of mechanics, which are laid down without taking into 

 consideration whether there are souls or not ; but in an ultimate 

 analysis of the principles of physics, and even of mechanics, it 

 appears that we cannot explain these principles by modifications 

 of extension alone, and the nature of force already requires some- 

 thing else.' See also Antibarbarus Physicus, &c. (after 1687) (Or. vii. 

 343;. For Leibniz's account of (he development of his views, see 

 Ultimate Origination of Things, Appendix, p. 351. 



1 Cf. Monadology, 63 sqq. 



2 Cf . ibid. 70 ; Principles of Nature and of Grace, 3. 



