112 INTRODUCTION 



is completely inorganic : what we call ' inorganic ' is 

 really organic in a low degree *. 



The body of every created substance is the point of 

 view of its soul. As there is no vacuum in nature, the 

 changes in any one body affect every other. Thus in 

 every body the whole world is represented or expressed. 

 But in each dominant Monad, or soul, the aggregate 

 forming its particular body is more distinctly represented 

 than the rest of the world. Thus each soul perceives or 

 represents the universe through the medium of its own 

 body. While it does represent the whole, it represents 

 it in a form in which its own body is more distinct than 

 any other 2 . The body is like a special lens through 

 which the soul sees the universe. This, of course, fol- 

 lows from the view that body in general is relatively 

 confused perception. For each substance represents the 

 universe 'from its own point of view,' and its point of 

 view is simply the degree of confusedness (or of distinct- 

 ness, for they are entirely relative) of its perceptions 3 . 



1 Cf. Antibarlarus Physicus, &c. (G-. vii. 344) : ' But indeed, 

 although all bodies are not organic, nevertheless in all bodies, 

 including the inorganic, organic bodies lie hid, so that every mass 

 which to outward appearance is formless [rudts] and quite undif- 

 ferentiated [similaris\ is inwardly not undifferentiated but diver- 

 sified, and yet its variety is not confused but orderly. Thus there 

 is everywhere organism, nowhere chaos, which would be unbe- 

 coming a wise Creator.' 



* Monadology, 62; cf. Spinoza, Ethics, Part ii. Props. 12, 13 

 (Scholium), 16 (Coroll. i\ 26, &c. 



3 Yet it must not be supposed that the soul has perfect knowledge 

 of all that takes place in its own body. Cf. Lettre ii Arnauld (1687) 

 (GK ii. 90) : ' It does not follow that the soul must be perfectly 

 conscious [s'apercevoir'] of what happens in the parts of its body, 

 since there are degrees of relationship between these parts them- 

 selves which are not all expressed equally, any more than external 

 things are. The distance of the latter is balanced by the smallness 

 or other disadvantages of the former, and Thales sees the stars 

 when he does not see the ditch before his feet.' Also Lettre a 

 Arnauld (1687) (G. ii. 112) : In natural perception and in feeling, 

 it is enough that what is divisible and material, and is actually 

 divided among several beings, should be expressed or represented 

 in one indivisible being or in substance which possesses a genuine 

 unity. We cannot doubt the possibility of such a representation 

 of several things in one only, since our soul gives us an instance 



