STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ S PHILOSOPHY 113 



Changes in compound Substances. Development and 



Envelopment. 



Every compound substance is in constant change. No 

 created Monad, as we have seen r . can- ever be entirely at 

 rest: each, in virtue of its appetition, is continually 

 either unfolding (developing) itself (i. e. passing from 

 confused to more distinct perception), or enfolding (en- 

 veloping) itself (i. e. passing from distinct to more con- 

 fused perception). And thus, as the dominance of any 

 dominant Monad consists solely in the degree of distinct- 

 ness of its perception, the relations of formal dominance 

 and subordination, which constitute a compound sub- 

 stance, must be continually varying in particular cases. 



of it. But this representation is .accompanied in the rational soul 

 by consciousness, and then it is called thought. Now this expres- 

 sion occurs everywhere, because all substances are in sympathy 

 with one another, and each receives some proportional change, 

 corresponding to the least change which happens anywhere in the 

 universe, though this change is more or less observable, according 

 as other bodies or their actions have more or less relation to ours. 

 And I think that M. Descartes himself would have admitted this, 

 for he would doubtless allow that, because of the continuity and 

 divisibility of all matter, the least motion has its effect upon 

 neighbouring bodies, and consequently upon one body after another 

 ad infinitum, the effect proportionally diminishing. Thus our body 

 must be in some way affected by the changes in all others. Now 

 to all the motions of our body there correspond certain more or less 

 confused perceptions or thoughts of our soul. Hence the soul also 

 will have some thought of all the motions in the universe, and, in 

 my opinion, every other soul or substance will have some percep- 

 tion or expression of them. It is true that we are not distinctly 

 conscious of all the motions of our body, as, for instance, that of 

 the lymph ; but this may be compared with the fact that I must 

 have some perception of the motion of each wave on the shore, 

 in order that I may be conscious [apercevoir] of that which results 

 from the totality of them, namely the great noise that I hear when 

 close to the sea. Thus also we experience some confused result 

 of all the motions which take place in us ; but being accustomed 

 to this internal motion, we are not distinctly and reflectively 

 conscious of it, except when there is a considerable change in it, 

 as at the beginning of an illness. . . . Now since we are conscious 

 of other bodies only through the relation they have to our own, 

 I was right in saying that the soul expresses best what belongs 

 to our own body. Thus we know the satellites of Saturn or of 

 Jupiter, only in consequence of a motion which takes place in our 

 eyes.' Cf. Spinoza, Ethics, Part ii. props. 24 and 27. 



