Il8 INTRODUCTION 



Tlie Vinculum Substantiate. 



As to organic substance, one other point requires a brief 

 consideration. In a correspondence with Father Des 

 Bosses, Leibniz draws a distinction between a compound 

 substance, strictly speaking, and a mere collection of 

 things, such as a heap of stones, or a flock of sheep, or 

 an army. The compound substance has a certain unity ; 

 it is substantia composita [singular number]. It involves 

 something which gives a certain reality to its phenomena 

 (ens realizans phenomena), or, in other words, there is a 

 genuine bond of connexion between its phenomena (vin- 

 culum substantiale}. It is unumper se. The mere collection, 

 on the other hand, is not a substance but substances 

 ( substantiae, substantiatum, semi- substantia). It has no 

 unity of its own. Whether, as in the case of a heap of 

 stones, its unity consists in the contact of its parts or, as 

 in the case of a regiment, it is united by a common 

 purpose, the bond of connexion is entirely in the mind of 

 an observer. In short, when we regard such a thing as 

 a mere collection, we regard it as without a dominant 

 Monad, and therefore as not having a genuine body. It 

 is like the l corporation ' which, according to Sydney 

 Smith, ' has neither a body to be kicked nor a soul to be 

 damned.' It is unumper accidens, in contrast with unum 

 per se l . 



This distinction, however, is not to be regarded as 

 absolute. It is, in another form, the distinction which 

 we have already considered 2 between phenomena bene 

 fundata and the pure phenomena of imagination and 

 dreams. The vinculum substantiale is simply the con- 

 nexion of the phenomena, in virtue of which we describe 

 them as bene fundata, since this connexion arises from the 



and resembles in miniature the Divine nature.' See Monadology. 

 82 note. 



Cf. this Introduction, Part iii. p. 96, notes i and 2. 

 Cf. this Introduction, Part iii. p. 98. 



