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STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ'S 



Now, as we saw in considering the meaning of life and 

 death \ while the self-conscious or rational soul really 

 differs only in degree from the conscious and the uncon- 

 scious soul, it can never completely lose its rationality. 

 The animal soul may at death lose memory and descend 

 to a lower grade. But this is not possible in the case of 

 the self-conscious soul. And on the other hand, while 

 an animal soul may be raised to self-consciousness, 

 Leibniz finds it difficult to conceive that this can take 

 place without a special act or operation of God. Self- 

 conscious beings have thus a position of peculiar inde- 

 pendence, which requires us to devote to them special 

 consideration. We proceed, then, to consider Leibniz's 

 account (*a) of the form in which perception appears in 

 man, and (6) of the form in which appetition appears in 

 him ; these being the two essential characteristics of the 

 human soul as well as of every other Monad. 



(O) THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 



Leibniz seeks a Via Media between the Views of Descartes 

 and of Locke. 



Human perception or apperception is knowledge, 

 strictly speaking. Leibniz's theory of apperception is 

 thus a theory of knowledge. Now apperception is the 

 perception of eternal and necessary_,truths. It is clear 

 and distinct knowledge. But the human soul has also 



' It is also reasonable to suppose that there are below us sub- 

 stances capable of perception, as there are such substances above 

 us ; and that our soul, far from being the last of all, occupies 

 a middle position, from which it is possible to go up or down ; 

 otherwise there would be in the order of things a defect, which 

 certain philosophers call vacuum formarum.' Sur les Principes de Vic, 

 (1705) (E. 431 a; G-. vi. 543). Leibniz calls these higher beings 

 genies (genii). 'It is to be believed that there are rational souls 

 more perfect than we, which may be called genies, and it is quite 

 possible that some day we shall be of their number. The order of 

 the universe seems to require it.' Lettre a la Princesse Sophie (1706) 

 (G. vii. 569). 



