STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ^ PHILOSOPHY I2J 



mind. Locke, on the other hand, denies the existence of 

 innate ideas on the ground that children, savages and 

 idiots do not consciously possess them ; an argument 

 which implies that we have an idea only when we are 

 fully aware of it, that is to say, that ideas exist only in 

 self-consciousness^ or apperception. Thus apperception 

 (in the Leibnitian sense) is regarded by Descartes as 

 containing absolute, innate first principles, from which 

 particular truths may be deduced, while by Locke it is 

 held to give, not first principles, but simple ideas, which 

 are the elements out of which knowledge is built. In 

 both cases it is apperception that is appealed to ; mere 

 perception does not count l . 



Now the great central principle of the philosophy of 

 Leibniz is the idealizing of all substance, by regarding it 

 as throughout perceptive or representative. Apper- 

 ception, feeling and bare perception (which is not 

 necessarily anything more than the mere possession of 

 real qualities) are not different in kind but merely in 



1 Cf. Nouveaux Essais, bk. ii. ch. i, 19 (E. 226 a ; G. v. 107) : ' Phil- 

 alethes [representative of Locke]. " That body is extended without 

 having parts and that a thing thinks without being conscious 

 [s'apercevoir~\ that it thinks, are two assertions which appear equally 

 unintelligible." Theophilus [representative of LeibnizJ. " Forgive 

 me, sir, but I must tell you that in your contention that there is in 

 the soul nothing of which it is not conscious, there is a petitio prin- 

 cipii, which has already dominated our first discussion. It was 

 there used for the overthrow of innate ideas and truths. If we 

 were to grant this principle, we should not merely find ourselves 

 in conflict with experience and reason, but we should have without 

 any reason to give up our opinion, which I think I have made suffi- 

 ciently intelligible. But our opponents, very clever though they 

 are, have never produced any proof of what they so often and so 

 confidently declare regarding this matter, and besides it is easy to 

 prove to them the opposite, that is to say, that it is not possible we 

 should always deliberately reflect on all our thoughts. Otherwise 

 the mind would make a reflexion upon each reflexion ad infinitum, 

 without ever being able to pass to a new thought. For instance, 

 in being conscious of .some present feeling, I should always have to 

 think that I think of it, and again to think that I think of think- 

 ing of it and so ad infinitum. But I must surely come to an end of 

 reflecting upon all these reflexions, and there must, in short, be 

 some thought which we allow to pass without thinking of it ; 

 otherwise we should always dwell upon the same thing." ' 



