STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ^ PHILOSOPHY I2Q 



mind. And similarly, against the view of Descartes that 

 mind is an independent substance, opposed to matter, 

 Leibniz maintains that pure mind belongs to God alone, 

 and that mind as we have it is inseparable from matter 

 and is really nothing but matter raised to a higher power, 

 confused perception that has passed into greater clearness 

 and distinctness. As among created substances there is 

 no body without soul, so there is no soul without body. 



In opposition to Locke, he holds that the Mind always 



thinks. 



On the other hand, as against Locke, Leibniz contends 

 that the mind is never without thought. If mind is 

 a tabula rasa, receiving all its impressions from outside 

 itself, a mind without thought is a perfectly natural 

 supposition. And a posteriori Loeke holds that in dream- 

 less sleep the mind exists without thinking. Its existence 

 during such a sleep is, he thinks, assured to us by our 

 recollection afterwards of what took place in the mind 

 before the sleep. Further, Locke maintains that, 

 as body can exist without motion, mind can exist 

 without thought 1 . Now the ground of this contention 

 manifestly is that motion and rest are not relatively 

 but absolutely distinct from one another and, similarly, 

 that clear and distinct consciousness is absolutely and 

 not relatively different from unconsciousness. When 

 a body has no apparent motion, it is absolutely at rest ; 

 when a mind has no clear and distinct consciousness or 

 apperception, it is absolutely without consciousness. 

 To this the central principles of the philosophy of 

 Leibniz are in complete opposition 2 . While motion and 



1 Could this be regarded as a strictly logical development of one 

 side of Descartes's philosophy, thus revealing Descartes's inconsis- 

 tency ? Descartes would say that, as thinking is the essence of 

 mind, mind cannot exist without thought and yet it may exist 

 without any specific thought. 



2 Cf. Nouveaux Essais, bk. ii. ch. i, 10 (E. 223 a; G. v. 101): 

 1 Philalethes. " But I cannot conceive it to be more necessary for the 

 soul always to think than for the body to be always in motion, the 



K 



