130 INTRODUCTION 



rest are apparently absolute opposites, in reality, when 

 we regard them not abstractly but concretely in their 

 relation to the rest of the world, they can be understood 

 only as relatively distinct. For otherwise, the law_ of 

 continuity, which is the basis of any workable interpreta- 

 tion of lihe universe, would be broken. In virtue of this 

 law, then, rest must be considered as an infinitely small 

 degree of motion, and every body possesses at least a 

 tendency to motion or a virtual motion, even if it has no 

 actual, apparent, complete motion. In the same way, 

 when mind is considered concretely, as a real substance 

 related (through its representation of them) to all the 

 other substances of which the universe is composed, the 

 distinction between consciousness and unconsciousness is 

 seen - to be relative.] There can be no total absence of 

 perception, for absence of perception (representation) 

 would mean absence of relation to the rest of the world, 

 and thus a breach of the law of continuity. Unconscious- 

 perception of ideas being to the soul what motion is to the body." 

 . . . Theophilus. l ' You are right, sir. Activity is no more insepar- 

 able from the soul than from the body, a state of the soul without 

 thought and absolute rest in the body appearing to me to be things 

 which are equally contrary to nature and of which there is no 

 instance in the world. A substance which is once in activity will 

 be so always, for all its impressions persist and are merely mixed 

 with other new ones. When we strike a body we arouse in it ;or 

 rather determine) an infinite number of vortices as in a liquid, for 

 at bottom every solid has some degree of fluidity, and every fluid 

 has some degree of solidity, and there is no way of ever entirely 

 stopping these internal vortices. Now we may believe that, if the 

 body is never at rest, neither will the soul, which corresponds to 

 it, ever be without perception." . . . Ph. " But this proposition 

 the soul always thinks is not evident by itself." T7t. " I don't say 

 it is. It requires a little attention and reasoning to see it. Ordi- 

 nary people recognize it as little as they recognize the pressure of 

 the atmosphere or the roundness of the earth." Ph. " I doubt if 

 I thought last night. This is a question of fact, to be settled by 

 sense-experience." Th. " We settle it in the same way in which we 

 prove that there are imperceptible bodies and invisible motions, 

 although some people regard these things as absurd. In the same 

 way there are perceptions without much sharpness, which are not 

 distinct enough for us to be conscious of them or to remember 

 them ; but they make themselves known by certain consequences 

 they have."' 



