STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ S PHILOSOPHY 133 



tions, accordingly, are merely the confused perceptions of 

 the self-conscious Monad, and their function and value in 

 psychology may be estimated by reference to the im- 

 portance of confused perception in Leibniz's general 

 doctrine of substance. However great may be their 

 degree of confusion, and however little we may be 

 conscious of them individually or collectively, they are 

 still perceptions, one in kind with the highest, most 

 distinct apperception or self-consciousness. The realm of 

 self-consciousness includes the whole of substance ; it is 

 by no means limited to man and spirits higher than man. 

 But in the infinite variety of substances, self-consciousness 

 exists in an infinite variety of degrees ; and there are 

 many substances in which its degree is infinitely little, 

 that is to say, less than any degree that can be assigned 

 or named. 



Leibniz's Theory of Knowledge in relation to the main 

 Principles of his Philosophy. 



Thus Leibniz's theory of knowledge is simply the 

 epistemological expression of the main principles of his 



distinct : and matters cannot be otherwise, for if we were to take 

 notice of all, we should have to think attentively of an infinity 

 of things at once, all of which we feel and all of which make 

 impression on our senses. I say even more : something from all 

 our past thoughts remains, and none can ever be entirely effaced. 

 Now when we sleep without dreaming, and when we are stunned 

 by some blow, fall, illness, or other accident, there appears in us 

 an infinite number of little confused feelings, and death itself can 

 produce no other effect on the souls of animals, which must 

 without doubt, sooner or later, regain distinct perceptions, for 

 everything in nature happens in an orderly way. . . . Each soul 

 retains all its preceding impressions, and cannot split itself up. 

 ... In each substance the future has a perfect connexion with the 

 past. This is what constitutes the identity of the individual. 

 Yet memory is not necessary nor even always possible, because 

 of the multitude of present and past impressions, which come 

 together in our present thoughts, for I do not believe that there 

 are in man any thoughts which have not at least some confused 

 effect, or which do not leave some vestige to be combined with 

 later thoughts. We can certainly forget things ; but we might 

 also recollect them after a long interval, if only we were reminded 

 of them in the right way.' 



